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THE RHETORIC OF RACISM IN THE 
UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT 
KATHRYN STANCHI* 
Abstract: This Article is the first study that categorizes and analyzes all the ref-
erences to the terms “racist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy” throughout Su-
preme Court history. It uses the data to tease out how the Court shaped the mean-
ing of these terms and uncovers a series of patterns in the Court’s rhetorical us-
ages. The most striking pattern uncovered is that, for the Supreme Court, racism 
is either something that just happens without any acknowledged racist actor or 
something that is perpetrated by a narrow subset of usual suspects, such as the 
Ku Klux Klan or Southern racists. In the Supreme Court’s usage, the law and the 
Court are largely innocent in perpetuating racism. The other striking pattern is 
the significant modern uptick in the use of “racism” and “white supremacy” to 
deny or minimize the harms of racism or engage in blame-shifting tactics. This 
Article demonstrates how the Court’s definitions of “racism” and “white suprem-
acy” undercut the law’s potential to achieve racial justice and have removed the 
Court as a player in the fight against racism. To rectify this rhetorical (and doc-
trinal) problem, the Justices on the Court must name racism boldly and directly, 
especially when the Court and its decisions bear responsibility for it. 
INTRODUCTION 
 The United States struggles with defining racism. As one scholar noted: 
United States “culture has no common conceptualization of what racism is.”1 
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1 Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism and the Gates Controversy: The False 
Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. L.J. 1, 37 (2010) (discussing Christopher A. 
Bracey, The Color of Our Future: The Pitfalls and Possibilities of the Race Card in American Cul-
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Definitions of racism occupy a wide space and cover anything from isolated 
acts of overt discrimination to unconscious bias and embedded structural bias.2 
Our definition of racism is in such flux that Merriam-Webster Dictionary re-
cently changed its definition of “racism” to reflect the concept and breadth of 
structural racism.3 
 In this way, racism is an example of what academic Raymond Williams 
would call a cultural keyword.4 Cultural keywords are socially prominent 
words that contain multitudes of cultural meanings: meanings that can be con-
tradictory, contested, and changeable over time and across a wide range of au-
diences, disciplines, and fields.5 
 This Article treats the words “racism,” “racist,” and “white supremacy” as 
cultural keywords and examines the Supreme Court’s significant contribution to 
the cultural meanings of these terms. It explores the Supreme Court’s use of 
these terms in its opinions from the first use of the words through the present 
day. 
 The Article’s premise is that the Supreme Court’s ways of using these 
highly charged words is an authoritative pronouncement of what is and is not 
racist.6 It shapes the cultural and societal meaning of the terms. And because 
                                                                                                                           
ture, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 89, 100 (2009) (reviewing RICHARD THOMPSON FORD, THE RACE CARD: 
HOW BLUFFING ABOUT BIAS MAKES RACE RELATIONS WORSE (2008)). 
2 See JONATHAN KAHN, RACE ON THE BRAIN: WHAT IMPLICIT BIAS GETS WRONG ABOUT THE 
STRUGGLE FOR RACIAL JUSTICE 68–71 (2018) (noting that members of the Ku Klux Klan do not 
consider themselves racist). Jonathan Khan states that “[r]acism, in short, is not some static ‘thing’ 
that exists only in one particular form under all circumstances.” Id. at 71. Compare Racism, OXFORD 
ENGLISH DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2008) (defining racism as “[p]rejudice, antagonism, or discrimination 
by an individual, institution, or society, against a person or people on the basis of their nationality or 
(now usually) their membership of a particular racial or ethnic group”), with TA-NEHISI COATES, WE 
WERE EIGHT YEARS IN POWER: AN AMERICAN TRAGEDY 123–24 (2017) (“Racism is not merely a 
simplistic hatred. It is, more often, broad sympathy toward some and a broader skepticism toward 
others.”), and IBRAM X. KENDI, HOW TO BE AN ANTIRACIST 17–18 (2019) (“Racism is a marriage of 
racist policies and racist ideas that produces and normalizes racial inequities.”). 
3 See Christine Hauser, Merriam-Webster Revises ‘Racism’ Entry After Missouri Woman Asks for 
Changes, N.Y. TIMES (June 10, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/06/10/us/merriam-webster-
racism-definition.html [https://perma.cc/2F8Y-MGPU] (discussing how Merriam-Webster expanded 
its definition of “racism” to include not just prejudice against individuals of a certain skin color, but 
also oppression based on social and institutional power). 
4 See RAYMOND WILLIAMS, KEYWORDS: A VOCABULARY OF CULTURE AND SOCIETY, at xxvii–
xxx (3d ed. 2015) (discussing how the meanings of particular words have changed with time). 
5 Id. 
6 By looking at the use of the terms “racist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy,” this Article in no 
way suggests that the only racism perpetuated, tolerated, or created by the Supreme Court is that 
which one or more Justices have labeled as “racist” or “white supremacy.” Nor does it suggest that the 
only way to challenge racism is to use those words. Indeed, there are many opinions that are powerful-
ly antiracist without ever using that word. For example, Justice Sonia Sotomayor’s dissent in Utah v. 
Strieff is often recognized as a powerful antiracist dissent and yet she never uses the word “racism.” 
See 136 S. Ct. 2056, 2070 (2016) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (“[I]t is no secret that people of color are 
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language can “reframe, reconstruct, and otherwise revise our very conception 
of reality,” the way a powerful entity like the Court uses these terms has a sig-
nificant impact on our perception of reality.7 
 But even more than that, the Supreme Court’s way of using these words 
also affects the behavior of others and, ultimately, the quest for racial justice. 
As Professor Robert Cover wrote, “[t]he judicial word is a mandate for the 
deeds of others” to the extent that “we expect the judges’ words to serve as 
virtual triggers for action.”8 The Court’s definition of “racism” or “racist” has a 
profound “trickle down” effect on lower courts and legal advocates; conse-
quently, it shapes the law’s ability or inability to rectify racism. 
 This Article makes two interrelated arguments about the way that the Su-
preme Court has defined “racism” throughout history. First, since the Supreme 
Court started using these keywords, its rhetoric of racism has consistently dis-
tanced the Court and the law from responsibility for upholding racism and rac-
ist policies. Supreme Court opinions almost never acknowledge the Court’s 
complicity in creating and upholding racist structures. Instead, when Court 
opinions use these keywords, they tend to deflect criticism away from the 
Court. Second, the rhetoric within the relatively few opinions that challenge 
racist laws and policies has become weaker over time. 
 The intersection of these two patterns—the rare use of these keywords to 
challenge racism and the weakness of the rhetoric in those rare cases—
constructs a narrow definition of racism as a pejorative term that encompasses 
                                                                                                                           
disproportionate victims of this type of scrutiny. For generations, black and brown parents have given 
their children ‘the talk’––instructing them never to run down the street; always keep your hands where 
they can be seen; do not even think of talking back to a stranger––all out of fear of how an officer 
with a gun will react to them.” (citation omitted)); see also Catherine M. Grosso & Barbara O’Brien, 
Grounding Criminal Procedure, 20 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 53, 76 (2017) (discussing the national 
media attention that Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Streiff received). Justice Marshall’s concurrence in 
Castaneda v. Partida also contains a particularly sophisticated analysis of racial dynamics for the time 
(1977) without ever using the word “racism.” See 430 U.S. 482, 503 (1977) (Marshall, J., concurring) 
(responding to Justice Powell’s argument that minority groups would not discriminate against people 
in the same minority group by noting that “members of minority groups who have achieved some 
measure of economic or political success and thereby have gained some acceptability among the dom-
inant group” may adopt negative attitudes toward their own group).  
7 Clarke Rountree & John Rountree, Burke’s Pentad as a Guide for Symbol-Using Citizens, 34 
STUD. PHIL. EDUC. 349, 350 (2015). We use, but are simultaneously used by, language. See KENNETH 
BURKE, LANGUAGE AS SYMBOLIC ACTION: ESSAYS ON LIFE, LITERATURE, AND METHOD 6 (1966) 
(“Do we simply use words, or do they not also use us?”); NOEL A. CAZENAVE, CONCEPTUALIZING 
RACISM: BREAKING THE CHAINS OF RACIALLY ACCOMMODATIVE LANGUAGE 9 (2016) (“[I]t matters 
whether the words we choose are ‘race’ or ‘racism,’ ‘black’ or ‘African American,’ ‘minority’ or 
‘racially oppressed.’ It matters, for example, whether we select words that allow racism to be exam-
ined directly and explicitly or whether we opt to conform to what is comfortable and safe.”). 
8 Robert M. Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601, 1611–13 (1986).  
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only overt racism by a small number of “bad” actors.9 Not surprisingly, this 
definition goes hand in hand with legal doctrine, making it virtually impossible 
to use the law to combat racism and white supremacy.10 
 In Part I, this Article summarizes the methodology used to analyze the 
Supreme Court’s rhetoric.11 Part II gives a theoretical overview of critical race 
theorists’ critiques of the Supreme Court’s doctrinal approach to racism as a 
way of framing how the rhetorical analysis fits into the ongoing conversation 
about the Supreme Court’s approach to race.12 In Part III, the Article describes 
my categorization of the references and reviews each category in detail, high-
lighting trends and patterns.13 
I. METHODOLOGY 
 To determine how the United States Supreme Court has used the terms 
“racist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy” though time, I conducted a series of 
Westlaw searches designed to retrieve all references to these terms in Supreme 
Court case law. I was not interested in softer rhetoric such as “racial,” “race 
discrimination,” “racially charged,” or “racial bias.”14 Part of my thesis is that 
there is something particularly powerful and provocative about the words “rac-
ist” and “racism.”15 As Professor Noel Cazenave states, in the language of the 
                                                                                                                           
9 See ROBIN DIANGELO, WHITE FRAGILITY: WHY IT’S SO HARD FOR WHITE PEOPLE TO TALK 
ABOUT RACISM 71–72 (2018) (analyzing how “the good/bad binary” of racism first started and its 
practical impact); Ian F. Haney López, Is the “Post” in Post-Racial the “Blind” in Colorblind?, 32 
CARDOZO L. REV. 807, 815 (2011) (explaining that, in McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279 (1987), the 
Supreme Court rejected claims that racism influenced Georgia’s application of its death penalty, de-
spite extensive evidence suggesting such was the case, because, in the Court’s opinion, racism re-
quires particular actors and none were identified in that specific case). 
10 Ian Haney López, Intentional Blindness, 87 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1779, 1781–84 (2012). 
11 See infra notes 14–18 and accompanying text. 
12 See infra notes 19–58 and accompanying text. 
13 See infra notes 59–296 and accompanying text. 
14 Professor Noel Cazenave calls this softer rhetoric “racially accommodative language.” CA-
ZENAVE, supra note 7, at 7–8. The Supreme Court’s penchant for using more euphemistic language 
for racism might also be because it prioritizes etiquette or civility over plain statement. See Leslie 
Kendrick & Micah Schwartzman, The Supreme Court, 2017 Term—Comment: The Etiquette of Ani-
mus, 132 HARV. L. REV. 133, 135 (2018) (“In our view, the Court erred [in Masterpiece Cakeshop, 
Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commission, 138 S. Ct. 1719 (2018),] by elevating matters of eti-
quette—the importance of appearing respectful and considerate—over giving a reasoned justification 
for resolving conflicts between religious liberty and antidiscrimination law.”). 
15 See CAZENAVE, supra note 7, at ix (stating that certain words that are used to discuss issues 
surrounding racism downplay its effect and actually “allow[] racial oppression to flourish”); see also, 
e.g., KENDI, supra note 2, at 9, 18 (“‘Racist policy’ . . . is more tangible and exacting, and more likely 
to be immediately understood by people, including its victims . . . .”). 
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oppressed, racism is the most important word.16 Moreover, if racism is not 
called out, it is not challenged or threatened, and it will not change. White su-
premacy keeps its power because it is neutral, traditional, and never truly 
acknowledged.17 Naming racism, especially by a body as powerful as the Su-
preme Court, puts a reconstructive burden on the powerful and starts a painful 
but necessary process of change. 
 For the most part, I excluded opinions in which the Court quotes someone 
else (i.e., a witness, another court, or brief) unless the choice of quotation was 
a significant use of the word. I also eliminated most parenthetical or footnote 
uses of the word, particularly if quoting another case, brief, or scholar, again 
unless the use was significant or substantive. Also excluded are any uses of the 
words in a party name. Finally, I counted some references as one usage and 
others as more than one. Generally, if within one case, different Justices use 
the same keywords but in different opinions and in substantially different 
ways, I usually counted that case as more than one reference. But, if one Jus-
tice in one opinion used the keywords multiple times in the same way, I gener-
ally counted that as one reference.18 The resulting list includes ninety-two ref-
erences to “racist” or “racism” and fifteen references to “white supremacy,” for 
a total of 107 references. I then analyzed those 107 references to understand 
how the Justices used the words in the opinions. The resulting data reveals an 
interesting tapestry of the use of these keywords in Supreme Court opinions 
through eighty years of jurisprudence. As part of this analysis, I situated the 
usages of the keywords in time, connected the usages to the doctrinal shifts in 
the Court’s approach to racism, and analyzed and categorized the definitional 
and rhetorical usages. 
 Figure 1 shows the vast prevalence of “racism” and “racist” as compared 
to “white supremacy.” 
                                                                                                                           
16 CAZENAVE, supra note 7, at xi; see id. at 92 (“[R]acially accommodative terminology like 
. . .‘racial conflict’ . . . keeps hidden the[] hierarchical and asymmetrical nature [of race relations] 
. . . .”). 
17 Id. at x (“The abilities to see and to comprehend systems of racial oppression are essential . . . 
for those who would dismantle them.”); see id. at 77 (explaining that racism today is so hidden that 
acts of prejudice and human agency are not necessary); KENDI, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he only way to 
undo racism is to consistently identify and describe it . . . .”); Haney López, supra note 10, at 1876 
(“The country deserves an equality jurisprudence with eyes open to racial context.”). 
18 I have tried to indicate my counting strategies in the footnotes, especially when I deviate from 
this methodology. 
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Figure 1. 
 
II. DOCTRINAL THEORETICAL OVERVIEW 
 Critical race theorists have criticized and charted the timeline of the Su-
preme Court’s doctrinal approach to race.19 This paper does something slightly 
different by taking a hard, linguistic look at the rhetoric of the Supreme Court’s 
approach to racism. Nevertheless, the two conversations are hardly separate, so 
it makes sense to give a brief synopsis of what critical race theorists have said 
about the Supreme Court’s approach to race to situate this rhetorical look in 
that context. 
 Professor Sumi Cho has organized the Supreme Court doctrine as it ap-
plies to race into four eras: the Racial-Dictatorship Era, the Civil Rights Era, 
the Post-Civil Rights Era, and the Post-Racial Era.20 The Racial-Dictatorship 
Era was pre-Brown v. Board of Education and marked by white dominance.21 
                                                                                                                           
19 See infra notes 20–58 and accompanying text. 
20 Sumi Cho, Post-Racialism, 94 IOWA L. REV. 1589, 1605 (2009). Professor Cho considers every-
thing preceding the Court’s Brown v. Board of Education decision in 1954 as the Racial-Dictatorship 
Era. Id. (citing Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954)). The Civil Rights Era came next. Id. It 
began with the Brown decision and ended in 1986 when William Rehnquist became Chief Justice. Id. 
The third period, the Post-Civil Rights Era, encompasses 1986–2007. Id. This era spans both the 
Rehnquist and Roberts Courts. Id. And the final term, the Post-Racial Era, begins in 2007 and contin-
ues through the present. Id. 
21 See id. at 1605–06 (“[During the first era] whiteness . . . was a valuable form of property rec-
ognized and enshrined by law as a normative civic and legal ideal.” (citing Cheryl I. Harris, Whiteness 
as Property, 106 HARV. L. REV. 1707, 1713–14 (1993))). 
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Legislatures passed openly “race-d” laws meant to disadvantage “peoples of 
color” and the courts did nothing to alleviate the injustices (and often assisted 
in supporting them).22 Professor Cho outlines three “moves” by the courts that 
supported and upheld the racial apartheid of this era: (1) establishing legal ra-
tionales and doctrines that appeared race-neutral but were designed to defeat 
civil rights laws (e.g., “no private constitutional rights”); (2) making binary 
doctrinal distinctions that preserved racial hierarchy (e.g., public vs. private); 
and (3) creating foundational legal principles that solidified racial stratification 
(e.g., federalism).23 
 The Civil Rights Era was marked by the move toward formal equality.24 
In addition to Brown, this era is marked by the Civil Rights Act of 1964, the 
Voting Rights Act, and other legislation designed to undo the law’s de jure dis-
crimination against people of color.25 Professor Cho categorizes these deci-
sions as largely about “racial redemption”—attempting to cleanse whiteness 
(and the law) from its complicity in white supremacy.26 Rather than truly dis-
rupting the law’s participation in white supremacy, the cases of this era laid a 
foundation that would allow the Post-Civil Rights Era courts to maintain white 
dominance within a narrative of white innocence.27 At the same time, the push 
toward formal equality in this era also planted the seeds for the racial backlash 
that Professor Cho identifies as emerging in the 1980s.28 
                                                                                                                           
22 Id. at 1606. 
23 Id. at 1605–10. Examples of some of these “moves” include the Court’s rejection of concurrent 
jurisdiction, its reliance on the public versus private distinction to preserve subordination, and its 
further development of federalism and the plenary power. Id. 
24 Id. at 1611; see Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437; Civil Rights Act 
of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241. 
25 Cho, supra note 20, at 1611–12. These moves established facial equality only; they did not 
change the “substantive definition of what equality requires in material terms.” Id. at 1611. 
26 Id. at 1612. 
27 Id. at 1612–14 (discussing racial redemption, the “process through which whiteness is decou-
pled from its problematic association with white supremacy”); see Sumi Cho, Redeeming Whiteness in 
the Shadow of Internment: Earl Warren, Brown, and a Theory of Racial Redemption, 40 B.C. L. REV. 
73, 119–50 (1998) (using racial redemption as a framework for understanding legal history). Professor 
Thomas Ross used the phrase “white innocence” to refer to the narrative of the white “victim” of 
affirmative action. Thomas Ross, Innocence and Affirmative Action, 43 VAND. L. REV. 297, 302–03 
(1990). The term has expanded to include the assertion of white moral purity in the construction of 
racism. See, e.g., David Simson, Whiteness as Innocence, 96 DENV. L. REV. 635, 642 (2019) (arguing 
that this results in “making America’s tenacious racial hierarchy legally consistent with the country’s 
egalitarian aspirations”). 
28 Cho, supra note 20, at 1591–92, 1620 (explaining that racial backlash started in the “sunset of 
the civil-rights era” and the periods before post-racialism were a “land bridge” to the current back-
lash); see Cooper, supra note 1, at 32–33 (stating that racial backlash was a response to the gains 
made by the civil rights movement). 
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 The Post-Civil Rights Era starts with the elevation of William Rehnquist 
to the position of Chief Justice of the United States Supreme Court.29 This era 
is marked by: (1) the Court’s inversion of civil rights to mean the rights of 
white men were harmed by civil rights laws; (2) the Court’s use of equality 
principles to support racial hierarchy; and (3) the view that critiques of racism 
are the moral equivalent of racism.30 
 Cho’s final era, the Post-Racial Era, is exemplified by the Court’s deci-
sion in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School District No. 1, 
in which the Court struck down the plans of school districts that used racial 
classifications to achieve diversity and integration in their schools.31 In Cho’s 
view, the plurality in Parents Involved applied what were, at the time, “the 
newest judicial mechanisms created to preserve racial hierarchy” while simul-
taneously averring that racial discrimination was the problem of a bygone 
era.32 
 Overlapping with Professor Cho’s timeline is Professor Ian Haney 
López’s map of the evolution of the concepts of “colorblindness” and “mali-
cious intent.”33 When these two concepts converged in Supreme Court juris-
prudence, they created a double bind for those seeking racial justice. As Pro-
fessor Haney López described: “Colorblindness denies that the state’s purposes 
can be discerned; intent doctrine demands proof of malicious purpose.”34 
 According to Professor Haney López, the concept of colorblindness shift-
ed in the twentieth century from a progressive, quasi-utopian view of the Con-
stitution to a weapon used against race-conscious remediation.35 But, as Pro-
fessor Haney López explains, the damage of this new version of colorblindness 
goes beyond its use against affirmative action; it has changed the definition of 
racism itself by “defining racism as any use of race” and simultaneously defin-
ing “all interactions not expressly predicated on race, no matter how closely 
                                                                                                                           
29 Cho, supra note 20, at 1614. 
30 Id. at 1616. 
31 551 U.S. 701, 723 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., majority opinion) (stating that “racial classifications 
. . . to achieve racial balance . . . [are] ‘patently unconstitutional’” (quoting Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 330 (2003)). 
32 Cho, supra note 20, at 1616. In addition to the Court’s post-racialism (“legal post-racialism”) 
Cho also identifies “political post-racialism,” which was “popularized” by the election of President 
Barack Obama, the nation’s first African American leader. Id. at 1621–22. 
33 See Haney López, supra note 9, at 809–11 (summarizing the history of the colorblindness doc-
trine). See generally Haney López, supra note 10; (tracking the development of both the intent and 
colorblindness doctrines from the Civil Rights Era onward). 
34 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1784. 
35 Haney López, supra note 9, at 809–10; see Cooper, supra note 1, at 32–33 (explaining how the 
concept of weaponizing colorblindness to undermine Black civil rights was the predecessor of post-
racialism). 
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correlated with racial hierarchy” as “not racism.” 36 Haney López refers to this 
more modern use of colorblindness as “reactionary” colorblindness to distin-
guish it from the use of colorblindness that galvanized the civil rights move-
ment.37 
 For Professor Haney López, the tipping point of the Supreme Court’s em-
brace of reactionary colorblindness was the language in Brown to proceed with 
caution in dismantling Jim Crow laws “with all deliberate speed” instead of 
wholesale. By the 1960s, Professor Haney López notes, it became clear to “the 
friends and foes of racial emancipation” that racial segregation was thriving 
despite the Court’s move toward formal equality.38 As early as 1955, just one 
year after Brown, a district court in South Carolina used a colorblind rationale 
to undercut integration efforts; as Professor Haney López notes, from there it 
was just a “short step” toward reactionary colorblindness—the use of color-
blindness as a counterargument to race-conscious remediation.39 At the same 
time as the reactionary colorblindness philosophy was percolating in the courts 
in the late 1960s, the political arena saw the racial dog-whistle politics of the 
“tough on crime” era and the demonization of welfare recipients.40 All of these 
forces coalesced to eventually create what civil rights advocate Michelle Alex-
ander labeled the “New Jim Crow.”41 
                                                                                                                           
36 Ian F. Haney López, Post-Racial Racism: Racial Stratification and Mass Incarceration in the 
Age of Obama, 98 CAL. L. REV. 1023, 1062 (2010). 
37 Haney López, supra note 9, at 809; see id. at 811 (explaining that “[b]y the end of the 1970s, 
the rhetoric of colorblindness had been repurposed as an attack on affirmative action,” “shift[ing] . . . 
from emancipatory to reactionary”); see also Cooper, supra note 1, at 32–33 (attributing this evolution 
of “racial backlash” colorblindness to the civil rights movement and the combined policies of white 
conservatives and liberals that succeeded in “[s]hifting the costs of black civil rights to the white 
working and middle classes” and the “Southern Strategy” as a proxy for suppressing Black civil 
rights). 
38 Haney López, supra note 9, at 809–11. Jim Crow laws legalized racial segregation in public fa-
cilities in the South for approximately one hundred years following the Civil War era. Jim Crow 
Laws, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/early-20th-century-us/jim-crow-laws [https://perma.
cc/6EZ9-SLEE] (Jan. 19, 2021). 
39 Haney López, supra note 9, at 810 (identifying the use of colorblind rhetoric as a reactionary 
tool in a 1969 North Carolina statute and stating that after the passage of that statute, “it was but a 
short step to the contention that colorblindness affirmatively prohibited race-conscious integration 
measures”). 
40 Id. at 811–14; see Sara Grossman, Revisiting ‘Dog Whistle Politics,’ OTHERING & BELONGING 
INST.: BLOG (Sept. 22, 2017), https://belonging.berkeley.edu/blog-revisiting-dog-whistle-politics 
[https://perma.cc/E9L2-9NH8] (“‘Dog whistles’ are what [Haney López] terms political catch-phrases 
that don’t explicitly mention race but are ultimately used to refer to people of color and the various 
threats they apparently command.”). 
41 See Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow, 9 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 1, 8 (2011). See generally 
MICHELLE ALEXANDER, THE NEW JIM CROW: MASS INCARCERATION IN THE AGE OF COLORBLIND-
NESS 2 (rev. ed. 2012) (explaining the network of events that led to mass incarceration, which she 
terms a new type of Jim Crow). 
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 At first, state attempts to circumvent Black civil rights by passing legisla-
tion that embraced reactionary colorblindness were rejected by the Supreme 
Court. But as the membership of the Court changed, the Court came to em-
brace this philosophy.42 Professor Haney López identifies the watershed mo-
ment of the Court’s adoption of reactionary colorblindness as the Court’s 1978 
decision in Regents of the University of California v. Bakke.43 Justice Thur-
good Marshall attempted, to no avail, to convince the Bakke Court to reject 
reactionary colorblindness.44 After Bakke, colorblindness was firmly enshrined 
into the Constitution as a means of defeating racial equality.45 
 In addition to functioning as a sword against race-conscious remedies like 
affirmative action, reactionary colorblindness also contributes to racial injus-
tice by labeling as “not racist” anything short of an overt, clear, intentional 
slur.46 This “malicious intent” requirement began with the Court’s 1979 deci-
sion in Personnel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney.47 In Feeney, the 
Court held that a statute giving hiring priority to veterans did not violate the 
Equal Protection Clause even though it effectively excluded women from the 
top civil service jobs.48 The Court’s reasoning resulted in a “new . . . bifurca-
tion of equal protection” in which facially neutral laws, like the one in Feeney, 
would fall under intent doctrine and require an almost impossible showing 
from plaintiffs, whereas laws expressly using race (like affirmative action 
laws) would receive, and likely not survive, strict scrutiny based on the philos-
ophy of colorblindness.49 
 The 1987 case of McCleskey v. Kemp is, in Professor Haney López’s 
view, the zenith of this “flip-side” of the colorblind philosophy.50 In McCles-
key, the Court “shrugged off the most sophisticated and exhaustive survey of 
capital sentencing thus far undertaken when it rejected the claim that racism 
tainted Georgia’s death penalty machinery.”51 McCleskey demonstrated that the 
                                                                                                                           
42 Haney López, supra note 9, at 811; see also Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 
(1978)). 
43 Id. In Bakke, a white male challenged the constitutionality of a medical school’s affirmative ac-
tion program that required that sixteen out of one hundred seats be set aside for minority applicants. 
438 U.S. at 269–81 (opinion of Powell, J.). 
44 See Bakke, 438 U.S. at 401 (opinion of Marshall, J.) (“It is because of a legacy of unequal 
treatment that we now must permit the institutions of this society to give consideration to race in mak-
ing decisions about who will hold the positions of influence, affluence, and prestige in America.”). 
45 Haney López, supra note 9, at 811. 
46 Id. at 815. 
47 442 U.S. 256 (1979). 
48 Id. at 259, 277. 
49 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1786. 
50 Haney López, supra note 9, at 815. 
51 Id. 
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Court did not believe in “structural” or “unconscious” racism. 52 For the Court, 
there is no racism without an epithet or a confession of racist intent.53 
 The 1990s saw the full consolidation of reactionary colorblindness and 
malicious intent as exemplified in 1993 by Shaw v. Reno, in which the Court 
rejected a redistricting plan that created a majority Black congressional dis-
trict.54 Professor Haney López refers to this consolidation as “intentional 
blindness.”55 For Professor Haney López, Shaw’s significance was its empha-
sis away from the requirement of intentional bias and toward disapproval of 
any express use of a racial classification.56 
 Then in the 2000s, the Court expanded the doctrine of intentional blind-
ness in 2007 with Parents Involved in Community School District, No. 1 v. Se-
attle School District and again in 2009 with Ricci v. DeStefano.57 Professor 
Haney López states that in these cases, “the Court seemed to contemplate that 
colorblind ignorance should apply every time a government actor expressly 
considered race,” extending even to basic governmental actions like data col-
lection.58 
 Figure 2 is a (somewhat oversimplified) schematic of the eras that Profes-
sors Cho and Haney López described. This schematic is not meant to reduce 
the complexity and nuance of the work of these two scholars, but meant to help 
readers see, in context, the rhetorical shifts I point out in this Article. Figure 
2.1 is a schematic of the usages of “racism,” “racist,” and “white supremacy” 
grouped roughly by era to allow comparison between usages and the timelines 
of Professors Cho and Haney López. 
                                                                                                                           
52 See id.  
53 Id. (“The majority reasoned as if racial discrimination did not exist unless the record included a 
racial epithet or a confession of evil intent.”). 
54 See 509 U.S. 630, 647 (1993) (referring to the redistricting plan as “political apartheid” and ar-
ticulating colorblindness as the ultimate goal of the Constitution); see also Haney López, supra note 
10, at 1868–70 (discussing Shaw and how it “converted intent into an ersatz colorblindness rule,” 
making it likely that any action to promote racial justice would be unconstitutional). 
55 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1870 (stating that Shaw and the other voting cases “herald[ed] 
the full ascent of colorblindness” as a judicial doctrine). 
56 See id. at 1869 (Shaw’s “intent test effectively abandoned any concern with intentions” and in-
stead was “solely concerned with the express use of a racial classification”). 
57 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 579 (2009) (“[E]xpress, race-based decisionmaking vio-
lates Title VII[] . . . .”); Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 732 
(2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (“Racial balancing is not transformed from ‘patently uncon-
stitutional’ to a compelling state interest simply by relabeling it ‘racial diversity.’” (quoting Grutter v. 
Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306, 330 (2003))); see also Haney López, supra note 10, at 1871–74 (arguing that 
Parents Involved imposed “racial blindness across government policymakers generally” and that Ricci 
“goes even further in exporting intentional blindness” to a federal antidiscrimination statute). 
58 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1872. 
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Figure 2.1. 
 
III. THE CATEGORIES AND RHETORICAL ANALYSIS 
 The first part of the process involved taking the 107 references and cate-
gorizing how the Court used the words “racist,” “racism,” and “white suprem-
acy.” Seven categories emerged with some inevitable overlap between catego-
ries. The seven categories are: (1) calling-out references, which call out racism 
by the law or the Court, thereby implicating the Court or national law or policy 
in racism; (2) pointing-out references, which do not implicate the Court but 
point out racism or its harms in cases where the majority missed it or the rac-
ism or harm is not obvious; (3) usual-suspects references, where the words are 
directed at perpetrators of obvious or overt racism, such as the Ku Klux Klan; 
(4) racism-out-there references, which include passive and abstract references 
that acknowledge that racism exists but deflect or hide the responsibility for it; 
(5) denying/minimizing-racism references, which deny that racism was a fac-
tor in the legal issue and/or minimize the harms of racism; (6) blame-shifting 
references, which turn the tables by blaming the victims of racism or their sup-
porters; and (7) comparator references, in which racism is used as a way to 
make a point about a largely unrelated issue. These categories are discussed 
more below. 
 A reference could challenge racism but be weak rhetorically. Therefore, in 
addition to noting the substance of how the keywords are used, I also evaluated 
the rhetorical power of the references. I used several criteria to evaluate rhetor-
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ical power. The first criterion is the clarity and directness of the reference. I 
coded references as more powerful if they were clear, declarative sentences 
with unambiguous meanings. Clarity and directness are, of course, subjective, 
but I used a number of markers to standardize my evaluation. I almost always 
coded passive voice as less direct because it hides the doer of the action and 
deflects responsibility.59 Scholars sometimes refer to the passive voice as “dis-
honest” because it hides or deemphasizes the source of the action.60 Passive 
voice was particularly important to my goals here because I was looking to see 
whether the Court attributed racism to any specific cause. 
 Similarly, circumlocution, meaning burdening sentences with excessive 
filler words, is a primary indirectness strategy.61 Wordy and overpacked sen-
tences are naturally less direct. Circumlocution and passive voice often go 
hand in hand and are commonly used when a writer wants to hedge or soften 
the impact of a sentence.62 Scholars sometimes refer to circumlocution as dou-
ble talk or double speak because of its deceptive qualities.63 Consider the dif-
ference between “Bob is a criminal” and “It was found that the criminal law 
was likely violated in Bob’s case.” The first is more powerful rhetorically. 
 Second, hedging language such as “seems” or “suggests” or words such 
as “possibly” or “maybe” also soften rhetoric. These types of hedge words 
convey the sense that the speaker “is uncertain . . . or cannot vouch for the ac-
curacy of the statement.”64 Hedge language also connotes that something un-
friendly or potentially offensive is being said and is used to mitigate a negative 
response.65 Similarly, I noted the use of euphemistic language that reduced 
                                                                                                                           
59 JEANNE FAHNESTOCK, RHETORICAL STYLE: THE USES OF LANGUAGE IN PERSUASION 159–60 
(2011); see Laura E. Little, Hiding with Words: Obfuscation, Avoidance, and Federal Jurisdiction, 46 
UCLA L. REV. 75, 97 (1998) (“Within the context of a case holding, the passive voice can deflect 
attention from the Court’s responsibility for the ruling or hide the identity of those responsible for the 
actions or processes described.”). 
60 FAHNESTOCK, supra note 59, at 160. The agentless passive (e.g., “the car was hit”) avoids 
naming the actor entirely and the agentive passive hides the actor in the prepositional clause (e.g., “the 
car was hit by Jim”). Id. 
61 Samuel Gyasi Obeng, Language and Politics: Indirectness in Political Discourse, 8 DISCOURSE 
& SOC’Y 49, 55–56 (1997). 
62 BRYAN A. GARNER, LEGAL WRITING IN PLAIN ENGLISH 53 (2d ed. 2013) (referring to wordi-
ness and passive voice as “sap[ping] the strength” from writing); Obeng, supra note 61, at 54–56 
(noting that politicians commonly use circumlocution when discussing difficult topics to protect their 
careers and reputations). 
63 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE: A TRANSLATION 157 n.1 (Richard Claverhouse Jebb trans., 
John Edwin Sandys ed., 1909) (“[T]his circumlocution deludes us with the accumulation of words.” 
(quoting EDWARD MEREDITH COPE, 3 THE RHETORIC OF ARISTOTLE WITH A COMMENTARY 58 (John 
Edwin Sandys ed., 1877)). 
64 ROBIN TOLMACH LAKOFF, LANGUAGE AND WOMAN’S PLACE: TEXT AND COMMENTARIES 79 
(Mary Bucholtz ed., rev. & expanded ed. 2004). 
65 Id. 
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“the negative expressive potential” of the reference.66 Euphemistic language 
can be deceptive in that it conceals the truly negative aspects of a disturbing 
concept (like racism).67 For example, describing racism as “unfortunate” is a 
concealing euphemism because it minimizes the harm of racism while also 
making it seem as though it is out of the writer’s control. 
 Third, I evaluated rhetorical power by looking at the use of intensifying 
adverbs and adjectives or figurative language (like metaphor) to indicate pas-
sion or emotion.68 Vivid and graphic language is a common method of imbuing 
rhetoric with emotional power, going back to Cicero and Quintilian.69 Particu-
larly in legal discourse, where a dry, neutral tone is expected, any departure 
from that tone is conspicuous and striking. Describing something as “brutal 
racism,” for example, is usually more rhetorically powerful than simply saying 
“racism.” 
 Finally, I considered the placement of the reference. If it was in the main 
text, I coded it as more powerful than if it appeared in a footnote or a parenthe-
tical citation. 
 The Supreme Court first used the phrase “white supremacy” in 1928 in 
the majority opinion in New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman and the word 
“racism” in 1944 in a dissent in Korematsu v. United States.70 So the Court has 
only been using the words “racist”/“racism” for roughly seventy-five years and 
the phrase “white supremacy” for roughly ninety years. 
 Figure 2.2 is a graphic view of the usage of the keywords, grouped by 
category and time.  
                                                                                                                           
66 Milica Radulović, Euphemisms Through Time: The Rhetorical Power of Palliation, 14 LIN-
GUISTICS & LITERATURE 173, 173–75 (2016) (describing euphemisms as “palliative” and noting their 
potential for deception). 
67 Id. at 182–83. 
68 See BRIAN L. PORTO, RHETORIC, PERSUASION AND LEGAL WRITING: THE PEN IS MIGHTIER 
2–4 (2020) (discussing the power of figurative speech to enhance persuasion); Michael R. Smith, 
Rhetoric Theory and Legal Writing: An Annotated Bibliography, 3 J. ASS’N LEGAL WRITING DIRS. 
129, 133–36 (2006) (same). 
69 ROBERT COCKCROFT & SUSAN M. COCKCROFT, PERSUADING PEOPLE: AN INTRODUCTION TO 
RHETORIC 45 (1992). 
70 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting), abro-
gated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 
63, 76 (1928). If this seems late, it is. The Oxford English Dictionary records the first use of “racial-
ism” in 1880 (in the Michigan City Dispatch) and the first use of “racism” in 1903. Racialism, OX-
FORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY, supra note 2; Racism, id., supra note 2. But the term did not really enter 
the popular lexicon until later. See WILLIAMS, supra note 4, at 191 (pinpointing “racialism” as precur-
sor to “racism” as appearing in the early 1920s and “racialist” as precursor to “racist” first recorded in 
1930); see also Racism, WILLIAM SAFIRE, SAFIRE’S POLITICAL DICTIONARY 600 (2008) (noting the 
heavy use of “racism” in the 1930s and 1940s, usually in reference to fascism). 




 In the following sections, I discuss each category separately and review 
noteworthy cases in each category. 
A. Calling Out the Court’s Complicity in Racism 
 A reference falls into this first category, calling-out references, if it uses 
the terms “racism,” “racist,” or “white supremacy” either to implicate the 
Court as complicit in racism or to implicate the law in a way that changed the 
definition or scope of the words.71 Shockingly few references fall within this 
category. Throughout the Court’s history of using these terms (between seven-
ty-five to ninety years), Justices of the Supreme Court have acknowledged the 
Court’s complicity in racism only thirteen times.72 Only two of these refer-
ences are in majority opinions. 
                                                                                                                           
71 See KENDI, supra note 2, at 9 (“[T]he only way to undo racism is to consistently identify and 
describe it . . . .”). 
72 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion) (“rac-
ist”); id. at 1417, 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part) (“racist”); Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. 
Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1740–48 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concur-
ring in judgment) (“racist”); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (“racist”); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 394 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissent-
ing) (“racist”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissent-
ing) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy” (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967))); Patterson v. 
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 The cases in this category vary in rhetorical power and are further sepa-
rated into two subcategories: strong and weak references. Only five out of the 
thirteen references qualify as strong references. They powerfully and directly 
challenge the Court for its participation in upholding racism, and all of them 
are concurrences or dissents. The other eight, which include the two majority 
opinions, are weaker rhetorically. Although they acknowledge the racism of the 
law or the Court, they do so very subtly and indirectly or use faulty rhetoric. 
 Notably, although all of the calling-out cases seem to be spread out over 
time, the timing of the five strong references reveals a significant decrease in 
the strength of the rhetoric expressly calling out the Court’s racism. Three of 
the five strong references occurred in the four years between 1944 and 1948. 
The remaining two strong references were not published for approximately 
another forty-one and seventy-two years, decided in 1989 and 2020 
respectively. Moreover, looking at the rhetorical power of the thirteen refer-
ences as a whole demonstrates that as the rhetorical force of the stronger refer-
ences decreased, the rhetorically weak references increased. This trend can be 
seen in Figure 3, which shows the forceful references in blue and the weaker 
references in yellow. 
                                                                                                                           
McLean Credit Union, 491 U.S. 164, 212 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in 
part), superseded by statute, Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as stated 
in Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305–06 (N.D. Cal. 1992); City of Richmond v. 
J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551–52, 556 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Kemp, 
481 U.S. 279, 341–44 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“racism”); Loving, 388 U.S. at 11 (Warren, 
C.J., majority opinion); Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 672–74 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring); 
Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1944) (Murphy, J., concurring); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 
233 (Murphy, J., dissenting), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392. Note that Ramos is 
counted twice here, once for the majority (using “racism”), and once for Justice Kavanaugh’s concur-
rence (using “racism”). See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1405 (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion); id. at 1417, 
1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). In general, when one opinion used the keywords more than 
once, I counted it as only one reference, unless the opinions used the keywords to mean substantively 
different things. So, although Justice Kavanaugh in Ramos uses “racist” four times, I counted it as 
only one reference. The number of times a Justice uses the keywords did factor into my assessment of 
the strength of the reference, however. 
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Figure 3. 
 
 Because the references in this category are significant in their impact on 
the law and broader culture, and also vary in their rhetorical force, they are 
discussed in detail below. 
1. The Five Strong References Calling Out the Court’s Racism 
 The five rhetorically strongest opinions that sound an alarm about the 
complicity of the Court in racist policies fall into this subcategory.73 All of 
these references occur in non-majority opinions, which means only non-
precedential opinions contain the Court’s most powerful challenges to racism. 
 Of these five opinions, the three most powerful occurred between 1944 
and 1948 and are all written by Justice Frank Murphy.74 In other words, the 
Court’s strongest and most consistent and vociferous antiracist was writing 
over seventy-five years ago. Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu v. United 
States was the first reference to racism in Supreme Court jurisprudence and 
contains the most rhetorically passionate and powerful use of the word in Su-
preme Court history.75 Justice Murphy became my touchstone in analyzing the 
rhetoric of other Justices, and few matched him. Of the three Murphy opinions, 
                                                                                                                           
73 See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1417, 1419 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); Croson, 488 U.S. at 551–52, 
556 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Oyama, 332 U.S. at 672–74 (Murphy, J., concurring); Ex parte Endo, 
323 U.S. at 307 (Murphy, J., concurring); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
74 See Oyama, 332 U.S. at 672–74 (Murphy, J., concurring); Ex parte Endo, 323 U.S. at 307 
(Murphy, J., concurring); Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
75 Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
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his dissent in Korematsu is the most rhetorically forceful. For that reason, this 
discussion focuses on that dissent. 
 Korematsu involved a constitutional challenge to the order of the United 
States government requiring all persons of Japanese ancestry, including United 
States citizens, to relocate to internment camps.76 The Supreme Court upheld 
the constitutionality of the order in a 6–3 decision based on the expansive 
powers of the executive branch in wartime.77 Justice Murphy’s dissent explicit-
ly denounced the Court’s decision as a “legalization of racism.”78 Justice Mur-
phy’s rhetoric in Korematsu also derives strength from the use of vivid meta-
phor, as in his description of the Japanese internment law as marking the coun-
try’s descent into the “ugly abyss of racism.”79 
 Justice Murphy’s Korematsu dissent stands out as the most forceful and 
direct reference in Supreme Court history using the word “racism” to explicitly 
accuse the Court of legalizing racism. Oyama v. California repeated the charge 
of legalizing racism, but the language originates from Korematsu.80 Oyama’s 
independent power emanates from its repetition of the word “racism” seven 
times and, like Korematsu, the use of vivid metaphor describing the California 
Alien Land Law as “racism in one of its most malignant forms.”81 In Ex parte 
Mitsuye Endo, Justice Murphy uses the word “racism” to reiterate his position 
in Korematsu.82 Reading the opinions together, the reader gets a sense of Jus-
tice Murphy screaming into a void, trying to convince his brethren to see the 
racism in their decisions. But even among these three strong opinions, Justice 
Murphy’s ringing indictment of the Court’s “legalization of racism” in Kore-
matsu is, in my view, the most heartbreakingly powerful. 
                                                                                                                           
76 Id. at 217–18 (Black, J., majority opinion). 
77 Id. 
78 Id. at 242 (Murphy, J., dissenting) (“I dissent, therefore, from this legalization of racism.”). 
Both Justice Robert Jackson and Justice Owen Roberts also dissented in Korematsu and were quite 
passionate about the implications of the law. Indeed, Justice Roberts called the internment camps 
“concentration camp[s].” Id. at 226 (Roberts, J., dissenting). But neither uses the word “racist” or 
“racism,” so I am not counting or discussing them here. 
79 Id. at 233 (Murphy, J., dissenting). 
80 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 672 (1948) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“I believe that 
the prior decisions of this Court giving sanction to this attempt to legalize racism should be over-
ruled.”). In an echo of the coronavirus pandemic, sometimes referred to by former President Trump as 
the “Chinese virus,” Justice Murphy also pointed out that California’s racist law originated with blam-
ing Asian people for a deadly virus. Id. at 651 (“The California Alien Land Law was spawned of the 
great anti-Oriental virus which, at an early date, infected many persons in that state.”). 
81 See id. at 673. 
82 Ex parte Mitsuye Endo, 323 U.S. 283, 307 (1994) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“I am of the view 
that detention in Relocation Centers of persons of Japanese ancestry regardless of loyalty is not only 
unauthorized by Congress or the Executive but is another example of the unconstitutional resort to 
racism inherent in the entire evacuation program.”). 
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 The only two other opinions that come close to matching Justice Mur-
phy’s passionate rhetoric occurred in 1989 and 2020 and both of them are less 
direct in their indictment of the Court: Justice Thurgood Marshall’s dissent in 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co. and Justice Brett Kavanaugh’s concurring 
opinion in Ramos v. Louisiana.83 It is worth stopping to think about this: after 
Justice Murphy’s three decisions, it took close to fifty years for any Supreme 
Court Justice to call out racism strongly and powerfully.84 
 Although Croson and Ramos lack the directness of Justice Murphy’s 
rhetoric, they are still (compared to many other opinions) rhetorically powerful 
uses of the words “racist” or “racism” to criticize the Court and its reasoning. 
In Croson, for example, Justice Marshall used the words “racist” or “racism” 
five times to dissent from the Court’s decision to apply strict scrutiny to af-
firmative action.85 Even though Justice Marshall does not explicitly call the 
Court or its reasoning racist, he comes close, stating: 
In concluding that remedial classifications warrant no different 
standard of review under the Constitution than the most brutal and 
repugnant forms of state-sponsored racism, a majority of this Court 
signals that it regards racial discrimination as largely a phenomenon 
of the past, and that government bodies need no longer preoccupy 
themselves with rectifying racial injustice.86 
Justice Marshall’s reference uses vivid adjectives (e.g., “brutal” and “repug-
nant”). The searing sarcasm of the clause “need no longer preoccupy them-
selves” makes plain Justice Marshall’s anger at the notion that racial justice is 
some triviality that is a bother to those in power. 
                                                                                                                           
83 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410–20 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part); 
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469, 551–52, 556 (1989) (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
Justice Gorsuch also uses the word “racist” in the Ramos majority opinion, but that reference is not as 
rhetorically powerful and is discussed in the second subcategory as a result. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 
1405 (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion). Similarly, Justice Sotomayor uses the word “racism” in her 
concurring opinion in that case, but it is not a calling-out reference (because she is noting the majori-
ty’s description of the racism underlying the laws at issue), so I do not include it here. Id. at 1410 
(Sotomayor, J., concurring). Justice Alito also uses the words “racist” and “[r]acism” in his dissent, 
but those references are coded in the blame-shifting category and I will be discussing them later. Id. at 
1425–26 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
84 Note that Brown v. Board of Education was decided in 1954, ten years after Korematsu, but 
nowhere in Brown do the words “racism,” “racist,” or “white supremacy” appear. See Brown v. Bd. of 
Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Similarly, Palmer v. Thompson, the 1971 equal protection case that up-
held Mississippi’s decision to close its public pools instead of integrating them, does not mention 
these keywords either. See 403 U.S. 217 (1971). 
85 488 U.S. at 550–56 (Marshall, J., dissenting). 
86 Id. at 552. 
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 But especially given the doctrinal damage done by Croson, Justice Mar-
shall’s dissent understated the Court’s complicity in upholding racism.87 Un-
like in Justice Murphy’s dissent in Korematsu, the word “racism” in Croson is 
used to refer to other governmental actors, not the Court. Justice Marshall’s 
language describes the Court’s sin as one of omission rather than active com-
plicity: the Court signaled that racial injustice is over, thereby allowing other 
government actors to ignore it. As Professor Haney López notes, Croson 
marked the turning point in the use of colorblind ideology to defeat race-
conscious remedies; given that, signaling is the least of the Court’s sins here.88 
Years before Croson was decided, prominent legal scholars, including Profes-
sors Randall Kennedy and Stephen Carter, were vociferously challenging the 
Court’s move toward equating racial remediation with racism.89 Why does the 
dissent not directly challenge the Court’s use of strict scrutiny as a way of 
propping up and sustaining racism? 
 Justice Kavanaugh’s opinion in Ramos is similar in tone.90 It is strong in 
some places, and weak in others. Ramos involved state laws that permitted 
non-unanimous juries to convict in criminal cases.91 Ramos found that non-
unanimous juries in criminal cases violated the Constitution and overturned 
Apodaca v. Oregon, a 1972 plurality opinion that permitted non-unanimity.92 
 Justice Kavanaugh, like Justice Marshall, does not directly implicate the 
Court in his rhetoric. He does not refer to Apodaca as racist or as upholding 
racism—a description that Apodaca richly deserves. His use of the keywords 
refers to the Jim Crow origins of the state laws in Ramos, a reference that 
would seem to place it in the usual-suspects category and not in the strong call-
ing-out category. But the power of Justice Kavanaugh’s emotional rhetoric sur-
rounding the words “racism” and “racist” and his indictment of Apodaca by 
implication led to its inclusion in this more forceful category. 
 Justice Kavanaugh describes the racism of the laws in a highly emotional 
way, departing from the typical neutral judicial tone. And the aspersions he 
casts strongly implicate the Court’s decision in Apodaca, as his whole opinion 
                                                                                                                           
87 The reasoning of the majority in Croson is a paradigmatic example of both post-racialism (i.e., 
racism is no longer a problem) and the reactionary colorblind philosophy described by Professor 
Haney López. See Haney López, supra note 10, at 1861. 
88 See id. at 1861, 1864 (the approach of the Court to discrimination post-Croson was available 
only to “buttress . . . [w]hite innocence” and “[w]hite victimization”). 
89 See Stephen L. Carter, Comment, When Victims Happen to Be Black, 97 YALE L.J. 420, 433–
34 (1988); Randall Kennedy, Commentary, Persuasion and Distrust: A Comment on the Affirmative 
Action Debate, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1327, 1334–37 (1986); see also Ruth Colker, Anti-subordination 
Above All: Sex, Race, and Equal Protection, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1003, 1033 (1986). 
90 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1410–20 (2020) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
91 Id. at 1393–95 (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion). 
92 Id. at 1397. 
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is about the advisability of overturning that decision. In a relatively short con-
currence (about 5000 words), Justice Kavanaugh uses the word “racist” several 
times—three times in the text and once in a footnote.93 He uses vivid adjec-
tives, referring to the non-unanimity laws as “one pillar of a comprehensive 
and brutal program of racist Jim Crow measures” and “a practice that is thor-
oughly racist in its origins and has continuing racially discriminatory ef-
fects.”94 His use of vivid adjectives (e.g., “comprehensive,” “brutal,” and 
“thoroughly”), along with his stark acknowledgement of the serious harm done 
to Black people by the laws, makes the opinion stand out from other usages of 
the keywords in Supreme Court opinions. 
2. The Eight Weak Calling-Out References 
 Eight of the opinions in the calling-out category implicate the Court or the 
law in racism but do so less powerfully and effectively than the references in 
the first subcategory. These eight references consist of just two majority opin-
ions: Loving v. Virginia, which uses “white supremacy,” and Ramos v. Louisi-
ana, which uses “racist.”95 The other six are dissents or concurrences. The mi-
nority opinions using “racism” or “racist” include two by Justice William 
Brennan and three by Justice Clarence Thomas. 96 The one minority opinion 
using “white supremacy” is a dissent by Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg.97 
 None of these references are as rhetorically powerful as Justice Murphy’s 
language, although several of them, including Loving and Ramos, arose in con-
texts in which powerful condemnation of the Court would have been eminently 
appropriate. Nevertheless, none of these eight references call out the Court for 
its “legalization of racism” as clearly or directly as Justice Murphy did. In oth-
                                                                                                                           
93 See id. at 1417–19 (Kavanaugh, J., concurring in part). 
94 Id. at 1417, 1419. 
95 See id. at 1405 (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 (1967) 
(Warren, C.J., majority opinion). The Ramos majority also uses “racist” and “racism” in a footnote, 
but because the substantive use is the same as in the text and the use is marginalized in a footnote, I 
focus on the use on page 1405. 
96 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1747 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment) (“racist”); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 
945, 951 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“racist”); Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 394 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“racist”); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341–44 
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“racism”). 
97 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) 
(“[w]hite [s]upremacy” (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11)); id. at 274 n.8 (“racism” (quoting Carter, 
supra note 89, at 433–34)). Because Justice Ginsburg’s use of “racism” is both in a footnote and en-
tirely someone else’s language, I did not count Adarand as two separate uses of the keywords. Even 
though Justice Ginsburg’s reference to “[w]hite [s]upremacy” is a partial quote from Loving, I counted 
it as an independent usage because Justice Ginsburg is saying something different (and more power-
ful) than what was originally said in Loving. 
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er words, in the decades after Korematsu, even the Court’s most liberal mem-
bers hesitated to confront the Court’s racism directly and passionately. And 
most of those usages occurred only in non-majority opinions that have little or 
no precedential weight. 
 A cultural shift occurred in those twenty-three years between Korematsu 
and Loving that made it more difficult for a Supreme Court Justice to directly 
and powerfully call out the Court or the law as racist.98 This led to a series of 
references in which the use of the keywords is much coyer, less direct, and less 
rhetorically powerful. This tracks closely with Professor Haney López’s time-
line, which identifies the early 1970s as a turning point in the Court’s doctrinal 
ideology toward race.99 
 This subsection will first analyze two majority opinions, Loving v. Virgin-
ia and United States v. Ramos, because of the obvious importance of the use of 
the keywords in a majority opinion. I then discuss some significant examples 
of the weaker calling-out that occurs in concurrences and dissents. 
a. The Majority Opinions: Loving and Ramos 
 Loving v. Virginia, which invalidated Virginia’s anti-miscegenation law, 
was a watershed moment in the dismantling of Jim Crow laws, perhaps even 
overshadowing Brown v. Board of Education.100 The Loving decision used the 
phrase “[w]hite [s]upremacy” twice in making clear that the Fourteenth 
Amendment abhorred classifications that were based in racist ideology.101 The 
decision finds itself in the calling-out category, despite the flaws outlined be-
low, because the Court’s uses of the phrase “[w]hite [s]upremacy” does a lot of 
                                                                                                                           
98 See supra Figure 3. 
99 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1781 (“Since the end of the civil rights era in the early 1970s, 
the emancipatory potential of the Fourteenth Amendment has been thoroughly undone.”). What Haney 
López describes in this quote (“the end of the civil rights era”) is a little earlier than what Professor 
Cho describes. See Cho, supra note 20, at 1605 (“I define the period from 1986–2007 as the post-
civil-rights era . . . .”).  
100 Brown has been the object of much criticism for its reasoning, which some argue did not do 
enough to undo the damage of Jim Crow racism. See WHAT BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION SHOULD 
HAVE SAID: THE NATION’S TOP LEGAL EXPERTS REWRITE AMERICA’S LANDMARK CIVIL RIGHTS 
DECISION 21–25 (Jack Balkin et al. eds., 2001) (summarizing the critiques of Brown); Haney López, 
supra note 9, at 809–10 (explaining that the Brown court “feared taking on too much too rapidly” and 
did not choose to dismantle “the emotional core of white supremacy”). Although scholars have also 
criticized Loving, many see it as a decision that created a seismic shift in the country’s views of race. 
See, e.g., Kevin Nobel Maillard, The Multiracial Epiphany, or How to Erase an Interracial Past, in 
LOVING V. VIRGINIA IN A POST-RACIAL WORLD: RETHINKING RACE, SEX, AND MARRIAGE 91 (Kevin 
Noble Maillard & Rose Cuison Villazor eds., 2012) (“Loving v. Virginia established a new context for 
racial possibilities in the United States.”). 
101 Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 11 & n.1 (1967) (Warren, C.J., majority opinion) (explaining 
that state objectives must be “independent of the racial discrimination which it was the object of the 
Fourteenth Amendment to eliminate”). 
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substantive work in defining and calling out the racism of a (then) popular pol-
icy. In particular, Loving’s use of “[w]hite [s]upremacy” to reject Virginia’s 
argument that the law was not racist because it burdened Black and white peo-
ple equally was a significant linguistic move for the Court. 
 Loving relentlessly laid bare the racism of the Virginia law by quoting the 
purposes of the Act, which included “preserv[ing] the racial integrity of its cit-
izens” and “prevent[ing] ‘the corruption of blood,’ ‘a mongrel breed of citi-
zens,’ and ‘the obliteration of racial pride,’” and called them “obviously an 
endorsement of the doctrine of [w]hite [s]upremacy.”102 The Court used the 
phrase “[w]hite [s]upremacy” again when noting that Virginia’s prohibition 
extended only to white people who intermarried (and not, for example, a Black 
person who married an Asian person).103 By quoting these shameful aspects of 
Virginia’s law and directly labeling them as “[w]hite [s]upremacy,” the Loving 
Court significantly shaped the law’s definition of white supremacy. The 
Court’s use of the keyword was a ringing rejection of white supremacy as an 
ideology and a pronouncement that the Equal Protection Clause would “abide 
no measure” of racism.104 
 Despite its momentous impact, Loving falls in the weaker calling-out cat-
egory because its two references to “[w]hite [s]upremacy” never directly call 
out the Court for its complicity in permitting anti-miscegenation laws. Loving 
does not mention, for example, how the Court allowed the perpetuation of anti-
miscegenation laws by declining in 1955 to hear Naim v. Naim, a case with 
facts virtually identical to Loving.105 The Court’s refusal to hear Naim permit-
ted anti-miscegenation laws to continue for thirteen years after Brown and 
caused serious damage to the civil rights movement and to interracial couples 
                                                                                                                           
102 Id. at 7. 
103 See id. at 11. In attacking racism, Chief Justice Warren states: 
There is patently no legitimate overriding purpose independent of invidious racial dis-
crimination which justifies this classification. The fact that Virginia prohibits only in-
terracial marriages involving white persons demonstrates that the racial classifications 
must stand on their own justification, as measures designed to maintain White Suprem-
acy. We have consistently denied the constitutionality of measures which restrict the 
rights of citizens on account of race. There can be no doubt that restricting the freedom 
to marry solely because of racial classifications violates the central meaning of the 
Equal Protection Clause.  
Id. at 11–12 (footnote omitted). 
104 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). This 
powerful language in Loving was missing in Brown and might explain why Loving accomplished a 
broader shift than Brown. It is unclear, for example, why Virginia (along with sixteen other states at 
the time) felt comfortable after Brown to continue enforcing its anti-miscegenation laws. What Brown 
left unclear about the constitutionality of racism, Loving clarified. 
105 Naim v. Naim, 350 U.S. 985 (1956) (per curiam). 
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who wished to marry and have children.106 Loving’s harsh criticism of Naim 
implicates the Court, but only very indirectly. 
 Indeed, because the Court in Loving reserved its use of “white suprema-
cy” to refer to Virginia’s openly racist Jim Crow law, the decision could have 
fallen in the usual-suspects category. Loving identified what was, even at that 
time, obvious racism.107 Given that, the rhetoric in Loving is surprisingly dry 
and syllogistic. There is, of course, power in the simple directness of a syllo-
gism.108 It brooks no argument. But in Loving, the simplicity of the prose bor-
ders on bloodless in a context (e.g., racism, slavery) in which the legal words, 
to paraphrase Professor Robert Cover, are drenched in blood.109 Given the ha-
tred embedded in Virginia’s law, and the Court’s act in declining to review that 
law when asked in 1955, the opinion’s use of “[w]hite [s]upremacy” is a far 
cry from the condemnation that it could have been, especially compared to 
Justice Murphy’s use of the keywords in Korematsu and Oyama.110  
 After Loving, it took the Court another fifty-six years to use the keywords 
in a majority opinion in a way that even obliquely challenged the Court’s re-
sponsibility for racism. Like the use of “white supremacy” in Loving, Justice 
Neil Gorsuch’s use of “racism” in the majority opinion in Ramos v. Louisiana 
labels a usual suspect (Jim Crow laws) but also implicates the Court in the 
perpetuation of racism by criticizing and overruling Apodaca v. Oregon.111 
Ramos was a close call in terms of categorizing but ended up in the calling-out 
category because it explicitly references “racism” in criticizing the Court’s de-
cision in Apodaca. Because so few majority opinions criticize the Court using 
these keywords, even obliquely, Ramos stands out in doing so. But because the 
Ramos decision’s criticism of Apodaca uses the keyword in an indirect and 
diffident way, it fell into the rhetorically weaker group of cases. Indeed, that 
                                                                                                                           
106 Richard Delgado, Naim v. Naim, 12 NEV. L.J. 525, 527 (2012) (recounting the doctrinal and 
cultural damage done by the Court’s refusal to hear the Naim case in 1955). Among other things, 
Delgado argued that the Court declined to hear Naim on a technical procedural ground that it “could 
easily have circumvented.” Id. at 525 n.2. 
107 Id. at 525–26 (pointing out that invalidating Virginia’s anti-miscegenation laws was a 
“straightforward application” of Brown and that at the time Loving was decided “the civil rights 
movement was in full force”). 
108 See LINDA L. BERGER & KATHRYN M. STANCHI, LEGAL PERSUASION: A RHETORICAL AP-
PROACH TO THE SCIENCE 123–24 (2018). 
109 See Cover, supra note 8, at 1601, 1607 (“Legal interpretation takes place in a field of pain and 
death. . . . Revolutionary constitutional understandings are commonly staked in blood.”). 
110 In this way, Loving exemplifies Professor Sumi Cho’s critique of the Warren Court as being 
primarily concerned with “racial redemption,” or, the attempt to exonerate white people and institu-
tions (including the Court) for its complicity in Jim Crow and societal racism. See Cho, supra note 20, 
at 1612 (“The Warren Court . . . [is] much like Lady MacBeth in her futile attempts to wash the blood 
of complicity from her hands.”). 
111 Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., majority opinion) (“Apodaca 
was gravely mistaken . . . .”). 
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may be one reason why Justice Kavanaugh chose to write his impassioned 
concurrence. 
 Justice Gorsuch uses the word “racist” just once in Ramos to criticize the 
Apodaca court for spending “almost no time [in the opinion] grappling with 
. . . “the racist origins of . . . [the] laws.”112 He does not condemn the Apodaca 
Court’s upholding of a racist law or its complicity in helping states uphold a 
racist criminal justice system that disproportionately imprisons Black people. 
The Court’s characterization of Apodaca’s transgression as failure to “grappl[e] 
with” racism greatly minimizes the racist damage done by Apodaca in endors-
ing and supporting the mass incarceration of Black people, many of them in-
nocent.113 The language surrounding the racism of Apodaca is much weaker, 
for example, than the rhetoric Justice Gorsuch used to condemn the doctrinal 
problems with Apodaca.114 That difference demonstrates that it is acceptable to 
criticize the Court for its doctrinal mistakes, but less acceptable to accuse it of 
perpetuating racism. 
 In sum, although Loving and Ramos stand out as the only majority opin-
ions that come close to calling out racism, their use of the keywords signifi-
cantly diminishes the harm wrought by the Court in the perpetuation of racism. 
b. The Concurring and Dissenting Opinions 
 Six minority opinions fall into the category of calling out racism or white 
supremacy using weak rhetoric. Of these minority opinions, Justice Ginburg’s 
dissent in Adarand comes closest to criticizing the Court’s complicity in up-
holding racism. The remaining five references, for a variety of reasons outlined 
below, are so oblique and indirect that they barely edged into the calling-out 
category at all. 
                                                                                                                           
112 Id. Justice Gorsuch also uses “racism” in a footnote to respond to Justice Alito’s dissent, but 
because the reference is in a footnote and is not definitionally significant, I am not counting it as a 
separate reference. See id. at 1401 n.44. 
113 See Aliza B. Kaplan & Amy Saack, Overturning Apodaca v. Oregon Should Be Easy: Non-
unanimous Jury Verdicts in Criminal Cases Undermine the Credibility of Our Justice System, 95 OR. 
L. REV. 1, 36–51 (2016) (explaining how the nonunanimous jury rule contributes to wrongful convic-
tions and to structural racism in the criminal justice system in a variety of ways). See generally AL-
EXANDER, supra note 41, at 4–5 (stating that mass incarceration and the criminal justice system are “a 
stunningly comprehensive and well-disguised system of racialized social control that functions in a 
manner strikingly similar to Jim Crow”). 
114 The majority opinion is scathing in its condemnation of the reasoning of Apodaca, describing 
it as “a breezy cost-benefit analysis,” Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1401. Additionally, Justice Gorsuch de-
scribed that case’s reasoning as “dressed up to look like logical proof.” See id. at 1404 (Gorsuch, J., 
joined by Ginsburg & Breyer, JJ., plurality opinion).  
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 Justice Ginsburg’s use of “white supremacy” in Adarand Constructors, 
Inc. v. Pena criticizes the Court openly, if indirectly.115 Justice Ginsburg states 
that it was “[n]ot until Loving . . . [that] one could say with security that the 
Constitution and this Court would abide no measure ‘designed to maintain 
[w]hite [s]upremacy.’”116 Read closely, the sentence says that prior to Loving, 
the Court did “abide . . . measure[s]” designed to maintain white supremacy. 
As indirect as it is, the reference does call out the Court. 
 But the sentence is quite oblique. Syntactically, the double negative (“not 
until Loving . . . would abide no measure”) along with the disembodied “one” 
make the reference rhetorically weak. Instead of a challenge, the language 
reads more like a back-handed compliment (we finally did the right thing in 
Loving—good for us, sort of). It falls far short of the indictment that the Court 
deserved for the decades in which it endorsed and upheld white supremacy. 
The circumlocution––abiding measures designed to maintain––further weak-
ens the sentence. Consider a more active, streamlined version—something like 
“prior to Loving, this Court consistently upheld the constitutionality of white 
supremacy.” That would have been more powerful. 
 The other minority opinions just barely edged into the calling-out catego-
ry. In three instances, the opinions’ challenges to the Court’s racism is so 
oblique that I refer to them as “throwing shade.”117 In two others, the authors’ 
uses of the keywords to challenge the Court are obscured by a logical fallacy 
that makes them sound like a personal grievance.118 
                                                                                                                           
115 See 515 U.S. 200, 272 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (quoting Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 
1, 11 (1967)). Justice Ginsburg also uses the word “racism,” but because it is in a footnote and is 
completely a quotation of the language of a scholar, I did not count it. Unlike the reference to “[w]hite 
[s]upremacy,” none of the language in the footnote is Justice Ginsburg’s. See id. at 274 n.8 (quoting 
Carter, supra note 89, at 433–34 (1988)). 
116 Id. at 272 (quoting Loving, 388 U.S. at 11). Justice Ginsburg’s dissent is, in many ways, pas-
sionate and powerful, but not in her use of the words “[w]hite [s]upremacy” or “racism.” For example, 
her dissent implicates the Court in racism without using the word. Instead, she refers to Korematsu 
disapprovingly and quotes the overtly white supremacist aspects of Justice John Marshall Harlan’s 
colorblind reference in Plessy v. Ferguson. See id. at 272–75 (first citing Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 
537 (1896); and then citing Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944)). 
117 “Throwing shade” is a neologism that refers to a subtle and indirect criticism that falls short of 
an explicit insult. It arose in the 1980s as part of the Black and Latinx gay community and the drag 
scene in New York City. Throwing Shade, DICTIONARY.COM, https://www.dictionary.com/e/slang/
throwing-shade/ [https://perma.cc/Y8VT-JUKN]. The three “throwing shade” opinions are: Virginia 
v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 394 (2003) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, 491 
U.S. 164, 212 (1989) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), superseded by statute, 
Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 1071, as stated in Stender v. Lucky Stores, 
Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305–06 (N.D. Cal. 1992); and McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341–44 
(1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
118 Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1747 (2018) (Thom-
as, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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 The shade-throwing opinions are characterized by subtly insulting rheto-
ric that requires some thought or time to understand. “Shade” is by its nature 
very indirect—so indirect that the shade thrower has “plausible deniability.”119 
At first, you don’t necessarily see the insult, but upon further inspection, there 
it is. Justice Clarence Thomas’s dissent in Virginia v. Black, for example, is 
classic shade throwing. He reasons that a statute against cross-burning prohib-
its conduct, not expression, and so is permitted by the First Amendment. Not-
ing that the statute was passed at a time when segregation was legal in Virgin-
ia, Justice Thomas writes that “even segregationists understood the difference 
between intimidating and terroristic conduct and racist expression.”120 Justice 
Thomas never mentions the Court or his fellow Justices in relation to racism. It 
looks like a statement about segregationists. But if you read the reference care-
fully in the context of the majority opinion, which did not see the difference 
that “even segregationists understood,” it is certainly a fair reading that Justice 
Thomas meant to paint his colleagues in the majority as no better (and perhaps 
worse) than southern bigots. 
 In Justice Brennan’s two shade-throwing opinions, the rhetoric is charac-
terized by passive voice, hedge language, and circumlocution. For example, in 
1989 in Patterson v. McLean Credit Union, the Court read 42 U.S.C. § 1981 so 
narrowly that it cut off most avenues for redress for minorities subjected to 
discrimination by their employers.121 Justice Brennan responded by arguing 
that “[t]he fact that § 1981 provides a remedy for a type of racism that remains 
a serious social ill broader than that available under Title VII hardly provides a 
good reason to see it, as the Court seems to, as a disruptive blot on the legal 
landscape, a provision to be construed as narrowly as possible.”122 Again, the 
author levies a charge against the Court, but buries it in a subordinate clause 
(“as the Court seems to”) that is so indirect that a casual reader could miss it. 
Justice Brennan’s language is also timid and ineffectual. The powerful meta-
phor of a “disruptive blot” is obscured by a sea of excess verbiage and under-
mined by hedge language (“seems to”), negative phrasing (“hardly provides a 
good reason”) and passive construction (“to be construed”). A more direct 
challenge would look something like: “The Court treats § 1981 as a disruptive 
                                                                                                                           
119 Anna Holmes, The Underground Art of the Insult, N.Y. TIMES MAG. (May 14, 2015), https:// 
www.nytimes.com/2015/05/17/magazine/the-underground-art-of-the-insult.html [https://perma.cc/
2P9Z-J68S].  
120 Black, 538 U.S. at 394 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
121 See generally Patterson, 491 U.S. 164 (restricting the scope of § 1981 so drastically as to ren-
der it useless in protecting employees from racial discrimination in a wide variety of scenarios). Pat-
terson was legislatively overruled by the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Pub. L. No. 102-166, 105 Stat. 
1071; see also Stender v. Lucky Stores, Inc., 780 F. Supp. 1302, 1305–06 (N.D. Cal. 1992) (acknowl-
edging that the Civil Rights Act of 1991 superseded Patterson). 
122 Patterson, 491 U.S. at 212 (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
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blot on the legal landscape instead of an important remedy for a serious and 
frequent type of racism.” 
 Justice Brennan’s other shade-throwing dissent in McCleskey v. Kemp has 
similar problems. In that case, the majority heard and discounted a comprehen-
sive study of the racist application of the death penalty. Justice Brennan re-
marked that McCleskey’s evidence “is . . . disturbing . . . to a society that has 
formally repudiated racism . . . . [and] we ignore him at our peril, for we re-
main imprisoned by the past as long as we deny its influence in the present.”123 
As with Patterson, the passivity and circumlocution of this reference distances 
the Court from wrongdoing and dilutes the Court’s very powerful role in up-
holding racist death penalty laws. For example, it is unclear to whom “we”—
the subject of “ignore”—refers. Who is ignoring the evidence? It could be the 
Court, but it could also be one of the other actors that Justice Brennan refer-
ences earlier in the paragraph. Regardless, Justice Brennan’s use of the word 
“ignore,” much like Justice Gorsuch’s charging the Apodaca court with a fail-
ure to “grappl[e] with” racism in Ramos, greatly diminishes the Court’s re-
sponsibility.124 The McCleskey Court did far more than just “ignore” evidence; 
to paraphrase Justice Murphy, the Court legalized racist murder.125 Along the 
same lines, the choice to use the word “disturbing” to describe evidence that 
Georgia imposed the death penalty on Black people who murder white people 
at twenty-two times the rate as Black people who murder other Black people is 
extraordinarily euphemistic. Of all the cases in which a clear, harsh condemna-
tion of the racism of the Court was warranted, McCleskey should be at the top 
of the list. But none of the Justices saw fit to use the word to describe the 
Court’s actions in that case.126 
 Justice Thomas authored the final two opinions in this category, using the 
keywords to point out the Court’s hypocrisy when dealing with race.127 Alt-
                                                                                                                           
123 McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 344 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
124 See id.; see also Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1405 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., majority 
opinion). 
125 See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 242 (1944) (Murphy, J., dissenting), abrogated 
by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392 (2018). 
126 Justice Brennan was known as a dealmaker on the Court, and it may be that his dodgy rhetoric 
was designed to cull votes (or not lose them). See SETH STERN & STEPHEN WERMIEL, JUSTICE BREN-
NAN: LIBERAL CHAMPION 545 (2010) (describing Justice Brennan as “extraordinarily successful at 
building coalitions—even if that sometimes meant sacrificing clarity”). McCleskey was decided by a 
deeply divided Court and Justice Powell was famously on the fence about it. But this is not about 
blaming Justice Brennan for his rhetoric––he may have had very good reasons for writing about the 
racism of McCleskey the way he did. This paper asks why racism is a word that is so radioactive that 
Justice Brennan could not use it more openly in McCleskey. 
127 See Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colo. Civ. Rts. Comm’n, 138 S. Ct. 1719, 1747 (2018) 
(Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in judgment); Silvester v. Becerra, 138 S. Ct. 945, 951 
(2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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hough in these two opinions Justice Thomas used the keywords as a compara-
tor, I placed them in the calling-out category because they are primarily a criti-
cism of the Court’s approach to race (as opposed to making a point about 
something unrelated to race). Despite their pointed criticism of the Court, I 
placed these references in the weak calling-out category because although Jus-
tice Thomas’s language is aggressive, his rhetoric is not persuasive. It relies on 
a fallacious argumentation strategy called ignoratio elenchi, or the “red her-
ring” fallacy, which attempts to make a point by noting that other unrelated 
examples are worse.128 Rhetoric based on this strategy tends to sound more 
like a bitter personal grievance than an argument. 
 In 2018 in Masterpiece Cakeshop, Ltd. v. Colorado Civil Rights Commis-
sion, for example, a baker refused to make a wedding cake for a gay couple. 
Justice Thomas’s concurrence takes issue with the various references to the 
dignity of gay people and the stigma of denying their rights: 
[I]t is also hard to see how [the baker’s] statement is worse than the 
racist, demeaning, and even threatening speech toward blacks that 
this Court has tolerated in previous decisions. Concerns about “dig-
nity” and “stigma” did not carry the day when this Court affirmed 
the right of white supremacists to burn a 25-foot cross; conduct a 
rally on Martin Luther King Jr.’s birthday; or circulate a film featur-
ing hooded Klan members who were brandishing weapons and 
threatening to “Bury the n[*****]s.”129 
 Justice Thomas’s dissent in Masterpiece Cakeshop demonstrates the fal-
lacy clearly. What, exactly, does the Court’s tolerance of racism have to do 
with the dignity of gay people? If we follow Justice Thomas’s argument to its 
                                                                                                                           
128 Ignoratio elenchi is sometimes referred to as the fallacy of irrelevancy or “shifting ground.” 
THOMAS FOWLER, THE ELEMENTS OF DEDUCTIVE LOGIC 138, 147 (1867). It occurs any time some-
one makes a point that is unrelated to the original argument or otherwise deflects focus from the origi-
nal argument. Id.; 1 THE ORGANON, OR LOGICAL TREATISES, OF ARISTOTLE 222–23 (Octavius Freire 
Owen trans., 1889) (explaining that elenchi are syllogisms of contradiction). This fallacy is related to 
but not quite the same as the strawman fallacy. DOUGLAS WALTON, RELEVANCE IN ARGUMENTA-
TION 50–51 (2004). A classic example of ignoratio elenchi is the common response to the Black Lives 
Matter movement: “why aren’t you protesting Black-on-Black crime?” It is the use of a completely 
off-topic argument that may have a surface appeal but, in reality, is comparing apples and oranges. 
Shirley Carswell, What the ‘Black-on-Black Crime’ Fallacy Misses About Race and Gun Deaths, 
WASH. POST (July 8, 2020), https://www.washingtonpost.com/nation/2020/07/08/gun-deaths-affect-
more-white-men-than-black-men/ [https://perma.cc/T5ZC-J846]. 
129 Masterpiece Cakeshop, 138 S. Ct. at 1747 (Thomas, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (citations omitted). Similarly, in Silvester v. Becerra, Justice Thomas dissented from the 
Court’s refusal to review a statute requiring a ten-day wait for a firearm, noting “I also suspect that 
four Members of this Court would vote to review a 10-day waiting period on the publication of racist 
speech, notwithstanding a State’s purported interest in giving the speaker time to calm down.” 138 S. 
Ct. at 951 (Thomas, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
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logical conclusion, he seems to be saying that because the Court has tolerated 
racism and racial indignities that it should also tolerate homophobia. Or that 
the Court should not talk about the dignity of gay people because it has failed 
in similar contexts to respect the dignity of African Americans. In other words, 
he is arguing that one wrong should lead to two wrongs, not that both wrongs 
should be corrected. That is also what makes it seem like a personal grievance: 
you hurt me, so hurt them, too. Ultimately, the fallacy gives the rhetoric a petu-
lant quality that weakens its point and makes it easy to dismiss. 
B. Pointing Out Racism Without Implicating the Court 
 The second category is pointing-out references; it includes ten references 
that label racism without implicating the Court, even indirectly. Although the 
references in this category do not implicate the Court, they do present a deeper 
understanding of racism than the typical idea of racism as an isolated event of 
bias by “bad” people. Thus, the references in this category differ from those in 
the usual-suspects category because they do more than identify the racism of 
obvious perpetrators, such as white supremacy groups or the Confederacy. 
Most of these references point out instances of racism in the case that the ma-
jority decision missed or ignored.130 Along these lines, this category includes 
some of the very few references in Supreme Court jurisprudence to uncon-
scious racism.131 Even though references to unconscious racism are significant 
(especially as they are so rare), because the references do not accuse the Court 
of unconscious racism, I chose not to place them in the first calling-out catego-
ry. The ten pointing-out references span a wide timeline from 1944 to 1992 and 
vary in rhetorical power. All are concurrences or dissents. 
 All the references in this category are uses of “racism” or “racist.” There 
are no references to “white supremacy,” which highlights an interesting usage 
difference. White supremacy is not susceptible to the subtler definition and 
understanding of racism evidenced by the cases in this category. Somehow, 
                                                                                                                           
130 See Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1154 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 68–69 (1992) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Holland v. 
Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 497 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting); McCleskey v. Kemp, 481 U.S. 279, 341–
44 (1987) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 106 (1986) (Marshall, J., con-
curring); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 353, 358 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Carter v. 
Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 341, 343 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 553 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring); Duncan v. Kahanamoku, 327 U.S. 304, 334 
(1946) (Murphy, J., dissenting); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 209 (1944) 
(Murphy, J., concurring). 
131 See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1153–54 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); McCollum, 
505 U.S. at 68–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332–34 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing); Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). Note that McCollum, McCleskey, and Callins 
are also counted in other categories because of other uses of the keywords. 
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white supremacy is more of a “we know it when we see it” concept than rac-
ism, which has a wide spectrum of uses. 
1. Unconscious-Racism References 
 The Supreme Court refers explicitly to unconscious racism only four 
times.132 The first reference to unconscious racism comes from Justice Thur-
good Marshall in a concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky. That reference is 
discussed in detail below. The second appears in a dissent by Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor in Georgia v. McCollum, a case about peremptory challenges 
based on race.133 The third is by Justice Brennan in McCleskey, an opinion that 
was also counted in the weak calling-out category.134 The fourth is from Justice 
Harry Blackmun’s dissent in the death penalty case Callins v. Collins, an opin-
ion that I also count in the racism-out-there category. These references are all 
clustered in a short, eight-year time period from 1986 to 1994.135 They span 
from the middle of Professor Cho’s Civil Rights Era to her Post-Civil Rights 
Era.136 The references to unconscious racism dry up completely in the middle 
of the post-civil rights period, as Professor Cho might have predicted. For the 
                                                                                                                           
132 See Callins, 510 U.S. at 1154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari); McCollum, 
505 U.S. at 68 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (“[C]onscious and unconscious racism can affect the way 
white jurors perceive minority defendants and the facts presented at their trials, perhaps determining 
the verdict of guilt or innocence.”); McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332–34 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing 
Charles R. Lawrence III, The Id, the Ego, and Equal Protection: Reckoning with Unconscious Racism, 
39 STAN. L. REV. 317, 327 (1987)); Batson, 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
133 Although Justice O’Connor’s McCollum reference is a somewhat rhetorically softer reference 
(“can affect” gives it a maybe quality), she was the only member of the McCollum Court who recog-
nized and articulated the serious and deleterious impact the decision could have on minority defend-
ants. See Jeanette M. Boerner, Note, The Discriminatory Effect of the “Color-Blind” Jury: Georgia v. 
McCollum, 112 S. Ct. 2348 (1992), 16 HAMLINE L. REV. 975, 982, 994–95 (1993). Note that I also 
count Justice O’Connor’s dissent in McCollum in the denying/minimizing-racism category because 
she states that the Constitution “does not give federal judges the reach to wipe all marks of racism 
from every courtroom.” 505 U.S. at 69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
134 Whether to double count this opinion was a close call. Justice Brennan uses the phrase “un-
conscious racism” in his opinion, but it is the title of a cited law review article, which ordinarily I 
would not count as a substantive reference. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 332–33 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing). But because Justice Brennan also includes a quote from the article explaining “unconscious rac-
ism,” I decided that it should count here. See id. (explaining that unconscious racism is the attachment 
of “significance to race” in a way that is often “outside . . . awareness” (quoting Lawrence, supra note 
132, at 327)). 
135 Justice Blackmun in Callins argues that although the Court may “not be capable of devising 
procedural or substantive rules to prevent the more subtle and often unconscious forms of racism from 
creeping into the [criminal justice] system,” that should not prevent the Court from abandoning “the 
Furman promise.” Callins, 510 U.S. at 1154–55. Note that Justice Blackmun uses the keywords a 
number of times in different ways in this one opinion, so the opinion also appears in the racism-out-
there and denying/minimizing-racism categories. 
136 Professor Cho defines the Civil Rights Era as the period from 1954 to 1986 and the Post-Civil 
Rights Era as the time from 1986 to 2007. Cho, supra note 20, at 1605. 
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Supreme Court, unconscious racism does not exist past the mid-1990s. Figure 
4 shows the references to unconscious racism by time and by comparison to 
other references to the keywords. 
Figure 4. 
 
 Justice Marshall made the first reference to unconscious racism in a Su-
preme Court opinion in his concurring opinion in Batson v. Kentucky in 1986, 
the well-known case about the constitutionality of using peremptory strikes to 
remove jurors based on race.137 
 In that case, Justice Marshall highlights the unconscious racism of prose-
cutors and judges and ends with a blanket indictment of the criminal justice 
system: “[e]ven if all parties approach the Court’s mandate with the best of 
conscious intentions, that mandate requires them to confront and overcome 
their own racism on all levels—a challenge I doubt all of them can meet.”138 
The words of breadth here—“confront and overcome” and “on all levels”—
skillfully paints a picture of an entrenched problem of great magnitude.139 But 
                                                                                                                           
137 See 476 U.S. at 106 (Marshall, J., concurring). 
138 Id. 
139 Id. (emphasis added). Justice Marshall’s dissent in Hobby v. United States similarly describes 
racism as a problem of great scope and magnitude. In that case, Justice Marshall cautions that “a judge 
who engages in racist and sexist appointment practices” is just the beginning of a more “widespread 
region of tainted decisionmaking.” 468 U.S. 339, 353–54 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting). The meta-
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it is the clause following the em dash, a grammatical flourish that emphasizes 
Justice Marshall’s skepticism about our ability to overcome our racism, that 
gives the reference its punch. But even here, the passivity is noteworthy. Jus-
tice Marshall describes his skepticism about whether prosecutors and judges 
“can” overcome their racism, not whether they are willing to do the work to 
overcome it. That frees them from responsibility for doing the hard work they 
would have to do to overcome it. 
 The Supreme Court’s lack of engagement with unconscious racism and its 
complete failure to even mention it after 1994 is noteworthy, especially as that 
concept has increasingly become part of the national conversation on race.140 
As rare as it is for the Supreme Court to acknowledge unconscious racism, it 
never refers to white supremacy as being “unconscious” or “subtle” (which is 
consistent with the common understanding of white supremacy). Apparently, 
one cannot unconsciously “do” white supremacy but somehow one can be 
“unconsciously” racist. Why racism is linguistically different is an interesting 
rhetorical question. The difference is noteworthy because in English becoming 
“unconscious” is passive. It is something that happens to us, often because of 
circumstances typically beyond our control. So, the idea of unconscious racism 
avoids responsibility; it sidesteps and hides the reality that the lack of con-
sciousness is, of course, the fault of the doer of the racism.141 As Professor 
Thomas Ross noted, “[t]he rhetoric of [white] innocence draws its power . . . 
from its connection with ‘unconscious racism.’”142 The passivity of “uncon-
scious” racism also makes the problem of racism seem intractable. Indeed, Jus-
                                                                                                                           
phor “widespread region” illustrates the vastness of the problem, comparing the spread of racism to an 
endless terrain. 
140 Unconscious racism had entered the mainstream of legal scholarship as early as 1987. See 
generally Lawrence, supra note 132 (explaining the role of unconsciousness in gender and racial dis-
crimination). The concept of unconscious racism, sometimes called implicit bias, has continued to be 
written about widely in the mainstream media. See, e.g., Sendhil Mullainathan, Racial Bias, Even 
When We Have Good Intentions, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 3, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/04/
upshot/the-measuring-sticks-of-racial-bias-.html [https://perma.cc/U5S6-8L8B]; Shankar Vedantam, 
How to Fight Racial Bias When It’s Silent and Subtle, NPR (July 19, 2013), https://www.npr.org/
sections/codeswitch/2013/07/19/203306999/How-To-Fight-Racial-Bias-When-Its-Silent-And-Subtle 
[https://perma.cc/TPB6-W338]. Even though my research looked only for the phrase “unconscious 
racism,” a quick look for similar phrases (“implicit bias” and “unconscious bias”) showed a similar 
lack of Supreme Court engagement, with zero references for “implicit bias” and only four references 
to “unconscious bias.” Many thanks to Professor Mary Bowman for pointing this out to me. 
141 See, e.g., Lawrence, supra note 132, at 326 (“We cannot be individually blamed for uncon-
sciously harboring attitudes that are inescapable in a culture permeated with racism. And without the 
necessity for blame, our resistance to accepting the need and responsibility for remedy will be less-
ened.”); see also Jules Holroyd, Responsibility for Implicit Bias, 43 J. SOC. PHIL. 274, 274 (2012) 
(acknowledging the philosophical argument that one cannot be faulted for implicit bias and attempting 
to debunk it). 
142 Ross, supra note 27, at 310. Ultimately, Ross concludes that unconscious racism is the undo-
ing of white innocence. Id. at 312. 
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tice Antonin Scalia apparently considered the problem of unconscious racism 
“an ‘ineradicable’ reality that the courts should ignore.”143 As documented 
here, the Court largely does exactly that. 
2. Labeling Racism and Its Harm in Cases Not Involving Usual Suspects 
 The final six cases in this category consist of minority opinions that point 
out racism where the Court’s majority ignored or denied it. These opinions 
span a wide time period from 1944 to 1990. Two are by Justice Murphy, two 
by Justice William Douglas, and two by Justice Marshall.144 For example, in 
Steele v. Louisville & Nashville Railroad Co., Justice Murphy clearly labels the 
railroad’s behavior as “racism” when the majority refers to it as “discrimina-
tion.”145 He also criticizes the Court for side-stepping the constitutional issue, 
writing that “[t]he utter disregard for the dignity and the well-being of colored 
citizens shown by this record is so pronounced as to demand the invocation of 
constitutional condemnation.”146 
 Justice Douglas’s 1969 concurring opinion in Powell v. McCormack is 
also noteworthy.147 In that case, the Court confronted the issue of the United 
                                                                                                                           
143 Haney López, supra note 10, at 1860 (quoting Memorandum from Justice Scalia to the Con-
ference, No. 84-6811—McCleskey v. Kemp (Jan. 6, 1987), reprinted in Erwin Chemerinsky, Eliminat-
ing Discrimination in Administering the Death Penalty: The Need for the Racial Justice Act, 35 SAN-
TA CLARA L. REV. 519, 528 (1995)). 
144 See Holland v. Illinois, 493 U.S. 474, 497 (1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (reminding the 
Court that using peremptory strikes against Black jurors is a harm not just to the defendant but to the 
dignity of the Black juror); Hobby v. United States, 468 U.S. 339, 353, 358 (1984) (Marshall, J., dis-
senting); Carter v. Jury Comm’n, 396 U.S. 320, 341 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (calling a 
Southern jury commission an “organ . . . of state law” with “a racist mission”); Powell v. McCormack, 
395 U.S. 486, 553 (1969) (Douglas, J., concurring) (suggesting that the United States House of Repre-
sentatives’ refusal to allow the plaintiff to take office had “racist overtones”); Duncan v. Kahan-
amoku, 327 U.S. 304, 334 (1946) (Murphy, J., concurring) (calling it a “deplorable” use of racism to 
justify military tribunals in Hawaii); Steele v. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co., 323 U.S. 192, 209 
(1944) (Murphy, J., concurring) (referring to the railroad union’s exclusion of Black employees as 
shrouded in a “cloak of racism” and urging the Court to reach out for constitutional issue). Although 
Carter could be categorized as a usual-suspects case because the actor is the Alabama Jury Commis-
sion, a frequent perpetrator of racism, I put Justice Douglas’s dissent in the pointing-out category 
because the majority opinion in Carter let stand a law that is clearly designed to allow whites to ex-
clude Black people from juries by using “good character” and “integrity” as proxies for race. The 
majority treats this law ahistorically, finding that the statute is not unconstitutional because on its face 
it does not mention race. See Carter, 396 U.S. at 331–36. Justice Douglas is alone in pointing out the 
racism embedded in the law. 
145 Compare Steele, 322 U.S. at 203 (majority opinion) (“Here the discriminations based on race 
alone are obviously irrelevant and invidious.”), with id. at 209 (Murphy, J., concurring) (“The cloak of 
racism surrounding the actions . . . still remains.”), and id. (“Racism is far too virulent today to permit 
the slightest refusal, in the light of a Constitution that abhors it, to expose and condemn it wherever it 
appears in the course of a statutory interpretation.”). 
146 Id. at 208 (Murphy, J., concurring). 
147 See 395 U.S. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
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States House of Representatives excluding Adam Clayton Powell based on a 
number of allegations unrelated to the criteria for service listed in Article I of 
the Constitution.148 Powell was the first African American to be elected to the 
House from New York and was a powerful and controversial civil rights figure, 
which almost certainly figured into his treatment by the House.149 Justice 
Douglas concurred in the Court’s decision that Powell could not be excluded if 
he met the Article I criteria and noted the “racist overtones” of the case.150 This 
was a subtle reference, to be sure, but significant because one could read the 
entire majority opinion and not realize that Representative Powell was African 
American. Powell’s race is not mentioned once in the majority opinion. 
C. The Usual Suspects 
 The third category contains twenty-one references in which a Supreme 
Court opinion uses one of the keywords to label intentional and extreme acts of 
prejudice by “bad” actors (like referring to Black people using the N-word) or 
“bad” institutions (like Jim Crow laws).151 I call these usual-suspects refer-
                                                                                                                           
148 See id. at 489–91. 
149 See generally WIL HAYGOOD, KING OF THE CATS: THE LIFE AND TIMES OF ADAM CLAYTON 
POWELL, JR. (2006) (detailing how Powell was both the most “celebrated and controversial” civil 
rights leader of his time). 
150 Powell, 395 U.S. at 553 (Douglas, J., concurring). 
151 Sixteen of the twenty-one references use the word “racist” or “racism.” See Peña-Rodriguez v. 
Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 862, 871 (2017) (Kennedy, J., majority opinion) (referring to a juror who 
stated, among other things, that Mexican men were controlling and aggressive with women (quoting 
United States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001))); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 
584–85 (2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (referring to remarks of Alabama legislators calling Black 
people “Aborigines” and implying that Black people are “illiterate”); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 
183, 184 (2006) (per curiam) (referring to a South African man who mistreated Black workers); Cutter 
v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 n.11 (2005) (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion) (referring to a prisoner 
who was a member of the Aryan Nation and his white-supremacist literature); Johnson v. California, 
543 U.S. 499, 502, 513 (2005) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (referring to the number of racists in 
U.S. prisons (quoting Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1120 (9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dis-
senting from denial of rehearing en banc))); Capitol Square Rev. & Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 
753, 770 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (referring to the Ku Klux Klan); id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 170–73 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to 
the Aryan Brotherhood); Andrews v. Shulsen, 485 U.S. 919, 920, 922 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting 
from denial of certiorari) (labeling a juror’s note that said “Hang the N[****]rs”); Bowers v. Hard-
wick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (referring to anti-miscegenation laws), 
overruled by Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. 
Org., 420 U.S. 50, 52, 55 & n.2, 56 (1975) (Marshall, J., majority opinion) (referring to a company’s 
failure to hire and promote Black workers); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 n.8 (1971) (Bren-
nan, J., majority opinion) (referring to Jim Crow laws designed to keep Black people from voting); 
Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 184 (1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (referring to 
racial segregation (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 429 (1968)), superseded by 
statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (2010), as recognized in Olivero v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 291 F. Supp. 3d 
1209 (D. Colo. 2017); Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 176, 180 
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ences because they label racism in circumstances so overt and egregious that 
labeling them as racist usually does not trigger white fragility. Many race 
scholars agree both that this is the current, predominant definition of racism 
and white supremacy in American culture and that it is the one with which 
most white people are comfortable.152 
 The references identify a surprisingly narrow number of usual suspects. 
The most commonly mentioned are Southern racists, Jim Crow laws, and the 
Ku Klux Klan, which account for the majority of the references.153 Other usual 
suspects include the Aryan Brotherhood, white nationalism, apartheid, and 
people who use language that is openly racist (e.g., the N-word, statements like 
“all Mexicans are criminals,” and the like). 
 Justice Potter Stewart’s 1968 majority opinion in Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer 
includes a great example of what qualifies as a usual suspect. There, he re-
buked the “racist laws in the former rebel states.”154 Similarly, the 1995 con-
curring opinions of both Justice O’Connor and Justice Thomas in Capitol 
Square Review & Advisory Board v. Pinette are usual-suspect references. Alt-
hough the opinions vote to permit the Ku Klux Klan’s petition to erect a cross 
                                                                                                                           
(1968) (Fortas, J., majority opinion) (referring to speech by National States Rights Party targeting 
Black and Jewish people); Jones, 392 U.S. at 413, 429 (Stewart, J., majority opinion) (referring to 
“racist laws of the former rebel states”); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 135–37, 142 (1966) (For-
tas, J., plurality opinion) (referring to Jim Crow era segregation laws). 
 Five of the cases use “white supremacy.” See Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 354–55 (2003) 
(O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (referring to cross-burning); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., 
concurring) (referring to the Ku Klux Klan’s erection of a cross); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 
229 (1985) (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion) (discussing Alabama law meant to disenfranchise Black 
people); Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149–50 (1965) (Black, J., majority opinion) (dis-
cussing a Louisiana Jim Crow voting law); New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 76–
77 (1928) (Van Devanter, J., majority opinion) (referring to the Ku Klux Klan). 
 Note here that Pinette makes up three of the total references in the usual-suspects category. Jus-
tice O’Connor’s concurrence, which uses the term “racism,” constitutes the first reference. 515 U.S. at 
772 (O’Connor, J., concurring). The second and third references are both credited to Justice Thomas’s 
concurrence, which uses the word “racist” and the phrase “white supremacy” and so is counted twice. 
Id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring). When an opinion quotes a keyword from another source (like a 
party or other court opinion), I generally did not count it unless, in my view, the usage was significant. 
152 See, e.g., DIANGELO, supra note 9, at 71–72 (analyzing how “the good/bad binary” of racism 
first started and its practical impact); Ta-Nehisi Coates, Playing the Racist Card: Ferraro’s Comments 
About Obama Were Racist. Why Can’t We Say That?, SLATE (Mar. 14, 2008), https://slate.com/news-
and-politics/2008/03/ferraro-s-comments-about-obama-were-racist-why-can-t-we-say-that.html 
[https://perma.cc/FPW5-7X3L] (“[I]n the popular vocabulary, the racist is not so much an actual per-
son but a monster, an outcast thug who leads the lynch mob and keeps Mein Kampf in his back pock-
et.”); see also Haney López, supra note 9, at 815 (stating that the Supreme Court adopted this view of 
racism in McCleskey v. Kemp). 
153 Nine of the usual-suspect references use the term “racist” or “racism” to refer to Southern rac-
ists, Jim Crow laws, or the Ku Klux Klan. Similarly, all five opinions to use the phrase “white su-
premacy” were referring to Jim Crow laws or the Klan. See supra note 151 and accompanying text. 
154 Jones, 392 U.S. at 429. 
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on a statehouse plaza, both Justices acknowledged that the Klan and the sym-
bolism of its cross are racist.155 
 This category contains some noteworthy timing. The first usual-suspect 
reference to “racism” or “racist” was in 1966 and broke an almost twenty-year 
silence on the appearance of those words in Supreme Court jurisprudence.156 
The 1966 reference appeared in a plurality opinion by Justice Abe Fortas in a 
case about Jim Crow laws in Louisiana.157 The first usual-suspect reference to 
“white supremacy” occurred in 1928, obviously much earlier than 1966 when 
the first usual-suspect reference to “racism” appeared. The 1928 reference to 
“white supremacy” appeared in Justice Willis Van Devanter’s opinion in New 
York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman in which he uses that label to describe the 
ideology of the Ku Klux Klan.158 And, similar to “racism,” there was a long 
gap after 1928 in which the Supreme Court was silent on white supremacy for 
almost forty years. Then, in 1965, Justice Hugo Black used the phrase “white 
supremacy” in Louisiana v. United States—another Louisiana case—to refer to 
a law enacted by Louisiana’s Segregation Committee designed to keep Black 
people from voting.159 
 No Court opinion labeled a usual suspect as racist until 1966, and, other 
than the outlier reference in Zimmerman, none mentioned “white supremacy” 
until 1965.160 Both of these references occur right smack in the middle of Pro-
fessor Cho’s Civil Rights Era. 
 Usual-suspect references peaked during the 1960s and 1970s, when the 
Court was active in attempting to dismantle Jim Crow laws.161 The use of the 
                                                                                                                           
155 See Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring); id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring). 
156 Before the 1966 usual-suspect reference, the last reference to racism was in 1948 in Oyama v. 
California, which was a calling-out reference. See 332 U.S. 633, 672–74 (1948) (Murphy, J., concur-
ring); see also supra notes 80–81 and accompanying text. 
157 See Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (Fortas, J., plurality opinion). 
158 New York ex rel. Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U.S. 63, 76–77 (1928) (Van Devanter, J., ma-
jority opinion). 
159 See Louisiana v. United States, 380 U.S. 145, 149, 152 (1965) (Black, J., majority opinion) 
(referring to both “white supremacy” and “white political supremacy”). In Justice Black’s majority 
opinion in Louisiana v. United States, he referred to the discriminatory voting requirements imposed 
by Louisiana’s Segregation Committee as designed “to preserve white supremacy.” Id. at 149. 
160 Before 1966, the only references to racism are by Justice Murphy and those references are dis-
cussed in the calling-out category. So, if we take Justice Murphy and his unusual antiracism out of the 
calculation, no Supreme Court opinion labels racism until 1966. 
161 See Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 n.8 (1971) (Brennan, J., majority opinion) (chang-
ing voting procedures without following federally mandated approval protocols was unlawful and 
likely done with a racially discriminatory purpose); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 184 
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (segregating races at restaurants due to state-enforced custom 
(quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 429 (1968)), superseded by statute, FED. R. 
CIV. P. 56 (2010), as stated in Olivero v. Trek Bicycle Corp., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1209 (D. Colo. 2017); 
Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 176 (1968) (Fortas, J., majority 
opinion) (reviewing whether a restraining order issued against the National States Rights Party for 
 
1290 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1251 
words “racist” and “white supremacy” in these decades was, of course, some-
what different than the usage of the 1990s and 2000s. It was no doubt more 
politically difficult to refer to Jim Crow laws as racist in those early decades. 
The last years of the Second Reconstruction in the 1960s and early 1970s, was 
a period of significant racial turmoil in the country, with political and legal 
victories for Black people offset by white violence and resistance.162 Alabama 
Governor George Wallace and his explicit message of segregation was still a 
winning mindset in the South. Three civil rights workers in Mississippi were 
murdered by the Ku Klux Klan in 1964, and law enforcement’s response was 
feeble.163 Martin Luther King was assassinated in 1968.164 
 But during this time, the Court was actively deciding civil rights cases. It 
decided not only Loving during this period, but also key civil rights cases 
Boynton v. Virginia (segregation) and Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenberg Board 
of Education (busing).165 It was a time of turmoil, but also a time when the 
Court had ample opportunity to stake out clear rhetorical ground on the issues 
of segregation and racism. 
 It staked out a rhetorical ground that was based on a very narrow defini-
tion of racism. In terms of rhetorical analysis and how the meaning of particu-
lar words evolved, the Court’s early and frequent use of the words “racism” 
and “white supremacy” almost exclusively in reference to the Ku Klux Klan 
and Jim Crow laws likely significantly contributed to American culture’s nar-
rowing of these terms to only these most egregious, overt contexts. As scholars 
                                                                                                                           
making racist speeches over the government’s public address system was improper); Jones, 392 U.S. 
at 429 (Stewart, J., majority opinion) (upholding statute barring racial discrimination in the sale of 
private property); Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. at 142 (Fortas, J., plurality opinion) (conducting a 
peaceful protest at a library with racially discriminatory lending practices); see also Cho, supra note 
20, at 1611–12 (“Following World War II, the second reconstruction or mid-twentieth-century civil-
rights movement ushered in liberal legal reforms designed to eradicate explicit discrimination imposed 
on racial grounds.”). 
162 See MASSIVE RESISTANCE: SOUTHERN OPPOSITION TO THE SECOND RECONSTRUCTION, at 
xii–xiv (Clive Webb ed., 2005) (providing a chronological overview of major civil rights and legal 
events from the 1950s). 
163 See This Day in History: August 04, 1964: Slain Civil Rights Workers Found, HISTORY, https://
www.history.com/this-day-in-history/slain-civil-rights-workers-found [https://perma.cc/VGA5-ML8G]. 
Although the federal response to the killings was marginally better than the response of Mississippi 
law enforcement, it was still far short of what such brutal and brazen murders warranted. For example, 
it took years and considerable pressure to bring the suspects to trial in federal court. The trial judge 
was an ardent segregationist, and the jury was all white. Only seven of the nineteen indicted were 
convicted, and none of those seven served more than six years for the crime. Id. 
164 Martin Luther King, Jr. Assassination, HISTORY, https://www.history.com/topics/black-history/
martin-luther-king-jr-assassination [https://perma.cc/MS4V-YSMF] (Jan. 26, 2021). 
165 See generally Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1971) (endorsing 
busing as a means to end school desegregation); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (striking down 
Virginia’s anti-miscegenation statute); Boynton v. Virginia, 364 U.S. 454 (1960) (overturning a tres-
pass violation of Black man in a “whites only” area). 
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have noted, the law and racial politics in this country define racism as only 
“clear proof of racial bias by a particularly bad actor.”166 The Supreme Court’s 
rhetoric bears significant responsibility for the current predominance of this 
meaning. 
 The rhetoric is closely connected with the Court’s doctrinal struggles with 
affirmative action, colorblindness, and the notion that only intentional discrim-
ination is actionable.167 So, even though the Court’s use of “racist” or “white 
supremacy” in the 1960s and 1970s may have been more forward-thinking and 
part of the Court’s effort to dismantle a particularly virulent form of racism, I 
stand by the label of usual suspect for these references because of the impact it 
had on the evolution of the language. 
 The timing of the usual-suspect references merits analysis. First, the 
Court used the words “racist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy” to refer to 
usual suspects frequently in the 1960s and early 1970s, then stopped for about 
a decade. From 1965 to 1975, Justices used these keywords to refer to usual 
suspects seven times.168 Then, from 1975 to 1984, no usual suspects references 
popped up at all. Then, the references to the usual suspects resumed frequency 
in the period from 1986 to 2017, with thirteen references.169 
                                                                                                                           
166 See Haney López, supra note 9, at 815. Haney López calls this the “flip-side of colorblind-
ness” in referring to the labeling as not racist anything “not expressly predicated on race, no matter 
how closely correlated with racial hierarchy.” Id.; see also DIANGELO, supra note 9, at 71–72 (noting 
that racism has come to be defined as only acts by “bad” people, mostly Southerners). 
167 See generally Haney López, supra note 9 (explaining how the Court’s willingness, or lack 
thereof, to acknowledge and attack racism in its opinions has influenced the public’s perception of 
what it means to be racist). 
168 See Emporium Capwell Co. v. W. Addition Cmty. Org., 420 U.S. 50, 55 & n.2 (1975) (“rac-
ist”); Perkins v. Matthews, 400 U.S. 379, 389 n.8 (1971) (“racist”); Carroll v. President & Comm’rs of 
Princess Anne, 393 U.S. 175, 176 (1968) (“racist”); Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 184 
(1970) (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (“racist” (quoting Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 
429 (1968)), superseded by statute, FED. R. CIV. P. 56 (2010), as stated in Olivero v. Trek Bicycle 
Corp., 291 F. Supp. 3d 1209 (D. Colo. 2017)); Jones, 392 U.S. at 429 (“racist”); Brown v. Louisiana, 
383 U.S. 131, 142 (1966) (Fortas, J., plurality opinion) (“racism”); Louisiana v. United States, 380 
U.S. 145, 149, 152 (1965) (“white supremacy”). 
169 See Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 871 (2017) (“racist” (quoting United States 
v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001))); Shelby Cnty. v. Holder, 570 U.S. 529, 584–85 
(2013) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“racist” and “racism”); Gonzales v. Thomas, 547 U.S. 183, 184 
(2006) (per curiam) (“racist”); Cutter v. Wilkinson, 544 U.S. 709, 723 n.11 (2005) (“racist”); Johnson 
v. California, 543 U.S. 499, 513 (2005) (“racists” (quoting Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d 1117, 1120 
(9th Cir. 2003) (Ferguson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)); Virginia v. Black, 538 
U.S. 343, 354 (2003) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy”); Capitol Square Rev. 
& Advisory Bd. v. Pinette, 515 U.S. 753, 770 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“racist” and “white 
supremacy”); id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“racism”); Andrews v. Shulson, 485 U.S. 919, 
920, 922 (1988) (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“racist” and “racism”); Bowers v. 
Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 210 n.5 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“racism”), overruled by Law-
rence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Hunter v. Underwood, 471 U.S. 222, 229 (1985) (“racism” and 
“white supremacy”). Note that Pinette created two keyword references: one for Justice O’Connor’s 
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 The other noteworthy pattern was that in the 1960s and 1970s, of the sev-
en references to usual suspects, six were in majority opinions.170 The outlier 
was a partial dissent by Justice Douglas in Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.171 
Then, starting in 1985, things changed. Of the thirteen references after 1985, 
six were in majority opinions and seven were in separate opinions, either con-
currences or dissents.172 Therefore, even in cases involving the usual suspects, 
the Court was less likely to use the words “racism” or “white supremacy” in a 
majority opinion to refer to those usual suspects after 1985. This rhetorical 
timeline tracked almost exactly with Professor Cho’s Post-Racial Era (starting 
in 1986) and Professor Haney López’s identification of the start of the Court’s 
“reactionary colorblindness.” Figure 5 shows a timeline of both majority and 
non-majority opinions in usual-suspects cases. 
                                                                                                                           
use of “racism” and another for Justice Thomas’s use of both “racist” and “white supremacy.” Justice 
Rehnquist’s use of “racism” in the majority opinion of Hunter is not counted because he is quoting the 
district court. 
170 See Emporium Capwell, 420 U.S. 55 & n.2; Perkins, 400 U.S. at 389 n.8; Carroll, 393 U.S. at 
176; Jones, 392 U.S. at 429; Brown v. Louisiana, 383 U.S. at 142; Louisiana v. United States, 380 
U.S. at 149–52. 
171 See Adickes, 398 U.S. at 184 (Douglas, J., dissenting in part) (quoting Jones, 392 U.S. at 429). 
172 Six references occur in majority opinions. See Peña-Rodriguez, 137 S. Ct. at 871 (Kennedy, J., 
majority opinion) (obliquely referring to juror’s comments about Mexicans as “racist” (quoting United 
States v. Henley, 238 F.3d 1111, 1120 (9th Cir. 2001))); Gonzales, 547 U.S. at 184 (per curiam) (“rac-
ist”); Cutter, 544 U.S. at 723 n.11 (Ginsburg, J., majority opinion) (“racist”); Johnson v. California, 543 
U.S. at 513 (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (“racists” (quoting Johnson v. California, 336 F.3d at 1120 
(Ferguson, J., dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc)); Black, 538 U.S. at 354 (O’Connor, J., ma-
jority opinion) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy”); Hunter, 471 U.S. at 229 (Rehnquist, J., majority opinion) 
(“white supremacy”). 
And seven references occur in minority opinions. See Shelby Cnty., 570 U.S. at 584–85 (Gins-
burg, J., dissenting) (“racist” and “racism”); Pinette, 515 U.S. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“rac-
ist” and “white supremacy”); id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (“racism”); Dawson v. Delaware, 
503 U.S. 159, 170–73 (1992) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (referring to Aryan Brotherhood); Andrews, 485 
U.S. at 920–22 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“racist” and “racism”); Bowers, 478 
U.S. at 210 n.5 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (“racism”). Pinette contains each of the keywords and 
therefore counts as three references. Note here that although Justice Marshall uses both “racist” and 
“racism” in Andrews, I counted Andrews only once because I counted multiple usages of the key-
words in one opinion as one usage, unless the usage involved a significantly different meaning. 
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Figure 5. 
  
 But even what Professors Cho and Haney López identify as “post-
racialism” or “reactionary colorblindness” does not entirely account for a 
Court that is unwilling to call even undeniably racist entities, like the Ku Klux 
Klan or Jim Crow laws, racist. Around 1985, at the end of Professor Cho’s 
Civil Rights Era, the Court shifted from one in which majority opinions called 
overtly racist laws or acts “racist” to one where this was done largely in sepa-
rate opinions that did not represent the voice of the majority of the Justices, 
and where these words did not appear in the opinion that stood as precedent. 
This rhetorical shift might have marked the beginning of the change in the 
meaning of “racism” to, as Ibram X. Kendi notes, “a vicious pejorative,” “a 
slur,” and “the worst word in the English language,” equivalent to the “N 
word.”173 
 The 1995 case Pinette, for example, involved a lawsuit over the Capitol 
Square Review and Advisory Board’s denial of the Ku Klux Klan’s application 
to erect a large cross near the Ohio State Capitol.174 The majority opinion held 
that the denial of the permit violated the Klan’s First Amendment rights.175 
Nowhere in the majority opinion do the words “racist,” or “racism” or “white 
supremacy” appear to describe the Ku Klux Klan. The Court only describes the 
                                                                                                                           
173 KENDI, supra note 2, at 9, 46–47. 
174 515 U.S. at 757–58. 
175 Id. 
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Ku Klux Klan using these words in two concurring opinions, one by Justice 
O’Connor and one by Justice Thomas.176 
 Another example was Justice Marshall’s dissent from the denial of certio-
rari in 1989 in Andrews, where an all-white jury sentenced a Black defendant 
to death.177 In the middle of the trial, one juror had handed the bailiff a napkin 
on which had been written “Hang the N[****]rs.”178 The Court can deny certi-
orari for many reasons, of course, but this case presented a particularly egre-
gious example of a capital case tainted by racism. Only Justice Marshall 
(joined by Justice Brennan) saw a constitutional violation here and was willing 
to label the juror’s statement as racism.179 
D. Racism “Out There” 
 The fourth category are references to racism “out there.” These references 
acknowledge racism’s existence in the world but fail to identify the perpetra-
tors of the racism. In fact, some references in this category have failed to 
acknowledge the Court as a perpetrator of racism even when the Court’s was 
blatantly complicit in upholding racist policies. Racism-out-there references 
are vague and passive; they suggest that racism simply happens as opposed to 
being purposefully created.180 
 References to racism “out there” allow the Court and the law to divorce 
themselves from responsibility in the construction of racism.181 To quote Pro-
fessor Richard Thompson Ford, these references to racism suggest “racial inju-
ry without racists.”182 In this way, racism-out-there references create and sup-
port the notion of white innocence.183 
                                                                                                                           
176 See id. at 770 (Thomas, J., concurring) (“[T]he Klan’s main objective is to establish a racist 
white government . . . . [T]he cross is a symbol of white supremacy . . . .”); id. at 772 (O’Connor, J., 
concurring) (“Despite the messages of bigotry and racism that may be conveyed along with religious 
connotations by the display of a Ku Klux Klan cross, at bottom this case must be understood . . . as a 
case about private religious expression . . . .” (citation omitted)). 
177 See 485 U.S. at 920–22 (Marshall, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
178 Id. at 920. 
179 Justice Marshall drafted the only dissent in this case, which Justice Brennan joined. 
180 See Ross, supra note 27, at 304 (noting that references to “societal discrimination” are “weak 
and abstract, practiced by no one in particular against no one in particular”). 
181 See Sarita Srivastava, “You’re Calling Me a Racist?” The Moral and Emotional Regulation of 
Antiracism and Feminism, 31 J. WOMEN CULTURE & SOC’Y 29, 40 (2005) (defining a “nonracist” as 
someone who acknowledges that racism exists in the world but denies personal involvement). 
182 FORD, supra note 1, at 58; see Bracey, supra note 1, at 91, 102 (discussing Professor’s Ford’s 
formulation); Coates, supra note 152 (“America has lots of racism but few actual racists . . . .”). 
183 See Ross, supra note 27, at 304 (commenting that references to “‘societal discrimination’ . . . 
[are] an important variant of the rhetoric of innocence” (quoting Wygant v. Jackson Bd. of Educ., 476 
U.S. 267, 276 (1986) (Powell, J., plurality opinion))). 
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 The fifteen references in this category span from 1972 to 2019.184 Inter-
estingly, there were no racism-out-there references prior to 1972; the general-
ized reference to racism seems to be a more modern rhetorical phenomenon. 
Moreover, only three references—two of which were in the same opinion—
occurred before 1984; the bulk of the references (twelve of fifteen) were be-
tween 1984 and 2019.185 Figure 6 depicts a timeline for racism-out-there refer-
ences as compared to other categories, showing a peak in the 1980s and 1990s 
and a small dip after that. 
Figure 6. 
 
                                                                                                                           
184 See Tharpe v. Ford, 139 S. Ct. 911, 912–13 (2019) (Sotomayor, J., respecting denial of certio-
rari); Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant Rts. & Fight for 
Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 572 U.S. 291, 314 (2014) (Kennedy, J., plurality opinion); 
Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 609 (2009) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Gratz v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 
244, 301 (2003) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting); Johnson v. De Grandy, 512 U.S. 997, 1020 (1994) (Souter, 
J., majority opinion); Callins v. Collins, 510 U.S. 1141, 1148, 1153–54 (1994) (Blackmun, J., dissent-
ing from denial of certiorari); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, 505 U.S. 377, 384 n.4 (1992) (Scalia, J., 
majority opinion); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 58 (1992) (Blackmun, J., majority opinion); 
Goodman v. Lukens Steel Co., 482 U.S. 656, 677 (1987) (Brennan, J., concurring in part and dissent-
ing in part), superseded by statute 28 U.S.C. § 1658, as stated in Jones v. R.R. Donnelley & Sons Co., 
541 U.S. 369, 371 (2004); Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 44 (1986) (Brennan, J., majority opin-
ion); id. 71–72 (Brennan, J., plurality opinion); Turner v. Murray, 476 U.S. 28, 39 (1986) (Brennan, 
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); Press-Enter. Co. v. Superior Ct. of Cal., 464 U.S. 501, 
521 (1984) (Marshall, J., concurring in judgment); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 
400 (1978) (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); id. at 407 (Blackmun, J., concur-
ring); Moose Lodge No. 107 v. Irvis, 407 U.S. 163, 183 n.4 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Note 
here that Bakke is counted twice, as Justices Marshall and Blackmun both referred to “racism” gener-
ally in their separate opinions. Also note that Thornburg is counted once.  
185 See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
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 All of these references were to “racism” or “racist;” none are to “white 
supremacy.” There seems to be no such thing as white supremacy “out there,” 
which is interesting in and of itself. Why is it that we are comfortable referring 
to racism so obliquely and abstractly, but it would seem silly to do so with 
white supremacy? This is almost certainly related to the results noted earlier 
about the dearth of white supremacy references in the pointing-out category 
and the absence of any concept of “unconscious” white supremacy. 
 Justice David Souter’s 1994 majority opinion in Johnson v. De Grandy is 
an example of the passivity and abstraction of typical racism-out-there refer-
ences. Justice Souter stated that Congress intended the Voting Rights Act to 
“hasten the waning of racism in American politics.”186 The reference contained 
no acknowledgment of the involvement of the law or the Court in the disen-
franchisement of Black people. Moreover, referring to the Voting Rights Act as 
seeking to “hasten the waning” of racism was exceptionally euphemistic. First 
of all, waning suggests that racism was diminishing when Congress passed the 
Voting Rights Act, which is historically inaccurate.187 And the notion that an 
Act that is considered one of the most effective civil rights laws ever passed by 
Congress was merely meant to “hasten” the demise of racism is a gross under-
statement.188 Overall, this quote looks like the Court was acknowledging the 
reality of racism, but in fact it euphemized the magnitude of the problem of 
racism in voting, ignoring the Court’s complicity in making the Voting Rights 
Act necessary, and referred to racism passively. 
 Another example of racism “out there” is Justice Blackmun’s dissent from 
the Court’s denial of certiorari in a death penalty petition in Callins v. Col-
lins.189 I hate to criticize this opinion because it is such a beautifully written 
condemnation of the death penalty.190 But rhetorically, the use of the word 
“racism” here is deeply problematic. Justice Blackmun referred to racism four 
times in his dissent and used the vivid metaphor of a virus to describe the prob-
                                                                                                                           
186 512 U.S. at 1020. 
187 The Voting Rights Act was passed in August of 1965. History of Federal Voting Rights Laws, 
U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.gov/crt/history-federal-voting-rights-laws [https://perma.cc/
A3WR-PQWN] (July 28, 2017). The civil rights movement was in full swing, but to say that racism 
was “waning” ignores the violence and strong resistance that met the movement during that time. As 
an example, just a few months before the Voting Rights Act was passed, state troopers had responded 
violently to a largely peaceful civil rights march in Selma, Alabama by the Southern Christian Leader-
ship Campaign, killing one marcher and injuring others. See WEBB, supra note 162, at xiv. 
188 See Introduction to Federal Voting Rights Laws, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., https://www.justice.
gov/crt/introduction-federal-voting-rights-laws-0 [https://perma.cc/MA34-VGKF] (June 19, 2009) 
(“The Voting Rights Act itself has been called the single most effective piece of civil rights legislation 
ever passed by Congress.”). 
189 See 510 U.S. at 1148 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
190 Justice Blackmun’s statement that he will “no longer tinker with the machinery of death” is 
some of the most affecting Supreme Court rhetoric in history. See id. at 1145. 
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lem of racism in sentencing.191 But none of the references held the Court ac-
countable for its participation in consistently upholding a racist system that 
disproportionately kills Black people. As vivid as it is, the virus metaphor con-
tributes to the ethereal quality of the racism described in the opinion—a virus 
is something over which humans have little agency. It infects us and spreads 
against our will. It is literally in the air. 
 Justice Blackmun’s dissent alternates between praising the Court for try-
ing its best and absolving it for its complicity in allowing and supporting the 
notoriously racist application of the death penalty. When Justice Blackmun 
ascribed agency to the Court, he did so to show how well-meaning the Court 
was. For example, in referring to Furman v. Georgia, Justice Blackmun notes 
that the Court “aspired to eliminate the vestiges of racism” in capital sentenc-
ing.192 Similarly, the Court was “apparently troubled by the fact that Georgia 
had instituted more procedural and substantive safeguards than most other 
States since Furman, but was still unable to stamp out the virus of racism.”193 
The Court was “troubled” by racism and “aspires” to end it. To Justice 
Blackmun, the Court was not racist; it was well-meaning and trying hard: the 
essence of white innocence.194 
 In addition to portraying the Court as well-meaning, Justice Blackmun’s 
prose erased the Court’s power to fix racism, painting the problem of racism as 
simply too difficult.195 He later noted that despite its aspirations, the Court 
“may not be capable of devising procedural or substantive rules to prevent the 
                                                                                                                           
191 See id. at 1148, 1153–54 (describing racism as a “virus” that “infect[s]” the criminal justice sys-
tem and needs to be “stamp[ed] out”). Note that Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Callins is also referenced 
in the unconscious-racism category (a type of pointing-out reference) and the denying/mimimizing-
racism category, for reasons discussed supra and infra. 
192 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1148 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (citing Furman v. 
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238 (1972) (per curiam)). Like Justice Souter’s use of “waning” in De Grandy, 
Justice Blackmun’s use of “vestiges” in this quote suggests that at the time Furman was decided, only 
small traces of racism in sentencing remained, which is false. 
193 Id. at 1154. 
194 Justice Blackmun’s rhetoric here is reflective of the definition of white innocence described by 
Professor Neil Gotanda, a kind of “Aha! Moment” where the writer sees “the light” because of evi-
dence that was not previously available. See Neil Gotanda, Reflections on Korematsu, Brown and 
White Innocence, 13 TEMP. POL. & C.R. L. REV. 663, 669–70 (2004) (arguing that the decision in 
Brown v. Board of Education exhibits this form of white innocence). Callins is Justice Blackmun’s 
“Aha! Moment.” What Justice Blackmun describes as the Court’s process mirrors most closely the 
definition of white innocence propounded by Professor David Simson in which a legal “move” makes 
“persistent racial hierarchy grounded in white supremacy” square with “American egalitarian aspira-
tions.” Simson, supra note 27, at 689.  
195 This calls to mind the Justice Scalia’s argument in his internal memorandum regarding the 
McCleskey decision that identifying and fixing unconscious racism is too difficult, and so it should be 
ignored. See supra note 143 and accompanying text. For this reason, Justice Blackmun’s dissent in 
Callins is also placed in the denying/minimizing-racism category, for his rhetoric denying that the 
Court can fix racism. 
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more subtle and often unconscious forms of racism.”196 Racism in the death 
penalty was not the fault of the well-intentioned Court; it was just that racism 
“out there” is so difficult and intractable. 
 Justice Blackmun’s criticism of the majority opinion in McCleskey v. 
Kemp is also problematic, as he stopped far short of accusing the McCleskey 
Court of racism or of tolerating racism. He referred to the McCleskey decision 
as documenting a “renowned example of racism” in capital sentencing as if the 
Court were merely an observer.197 The starkest criticism is his description of 
the Court as having “turned its back on McCleskey’s claims.”198 This paints 
the McCleskey Court passively—the Court “documented” the racism “out 
there” in capital sentencing but then “turned its back.” Recall that this is simi-
lar to both Justice Gorsuch’s rhetoric in Ramos that the Apodaca Court failed 
to grapple with racism and Justice Brennan’s characterization of the Court in 
McCleskey as “ignoring” evidence of racism.199 Rhetorically, it seems that the 
style of criticism permitted of the Court was that the Court ignored it, a charge 
that significantly downplayed the Court’s power and responsibility. 
 Given the egregious harm wrought by the McCleskey decision, and the 
Court’s active participation in perpetuating and downplaying the problem of 
racism in death penalty cases, characterizing what the Court did in that case as 
“turning its back on . . . claims” was beyond euphemistic. There was nothing 
that came close to Justice Murphy’s charge of legalized racism—and it would 
have been eminently fair to call McCleskey v. Kemp legalized racism. Where is 
the Justice Murphy-like charge that the McCleskey court had legalized the 
state-sanctioned killing of innocent Black people? Not in this dissent. 
E. Denying/Minimizing Racism 
 The fifth category includes thirteen references that explicitly deny racism, 
minimize its harms, or accept it as inevitable.200 References in this category 
                                                                                                                           
196 Callins, 510 U.S. at 1154–55 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari). 
197 Id. at 1153. 
198 Id. at 1154. 
199 See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text (discussing the Ramos majority opinion); su-
pra note 123 and accompanying text (discussing of Justice Brennan’s dissent in McCleskey). 
200 See Tharpe v. Sellers, 138 S. Ct. 545, 547, 553 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Brown v. Ent. 
Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. 786, 799 (2011) (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Parents Involved in Cmty. 
Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 730 n.14 (2007) (Roberts, C.J., plurality opinion) (cita-
tion omitted); id. at 781 n.30 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 
U.S. 306, 377 (2003) (Thomas, J., concurring in part); Callins, 510 U.S. at 1154 (Blackmun, J., dis-
senting from denial of certiorari) (stating that the Court “may not be capable of devising procedural or 
substantive rules to prevent . . . racism”); Georgia v. McCollum, 505 U.S. 42, 69 (1992) (O’Connor, 
J., dissenting) (“[T]he Constitution does not give federal judges the reach to wipe all marks of racism 
from every courtroom . . . .”); Dawson v. Delaware, 503 U.S. 159, 162, 165–66 (1992) (Rehnquist, 
C.J., majority opinion) (referring to any racist beliefs the Aryan Brotherhood “might hold” and quali-
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span from 1971 to 2018 and use the word “racism” or “racist.” Apparently, 
white supremacy is not something that can be easily denied or minimized. 
 One of the earliest examples of this was by Justice Lewis Powell in 1972 
in Johnson v. Louisiana, where he dismissed the argument that juries might be 
racist: “[s]uch fears [about racism] materialize only when the jury’s majority, 
responding to these extraneous pressures, ignores the evidence and the instruc-
tions of the court as well as the rational arguments of the minority.”201 Another 
Justice Powell reference occurred in 1979 in Columbus Board of Education v. 
Penick, a case dealing with racial segregation in public schools, where he ar-
gued: “It would be unfair and misleading to attribute [white flight] to a racist 
response to integration per se. It is at least as likely that the exodus is in sub-
stantial part a natural reaction to the displacement of professional and local 
control that occurs when courts go into the business of restructuring and oper-
ating school systems.”202 Justice Powell’s adherence to the ideology of white 
innocence is well documented in the scholarship, and not surprisingly, his 
rhetoric reflects that ideology.203 
 A more recent example was Justice Thomas’s dissenting opinion in Grut-
ter v. Bollinger, the 2003 University of Michigan affirmative action case. In 
that dissent, Justice Thomas referred to institutional racism as a belief held by 
“conspiracy theorist[s]” who maintain “that ‘institutional racism’ is at fault for 
every racial disparity in our society.”204 This reference could also be seen as 
blame-shifting because it labeled those who call out institutional racism as 
“conspiracy theorist[s],” but I labeled it as a denying/minimizing-racism refer-
                                                                                                                           
fying the group’s beliefs by noting “[e]ven if the [Aryan Brotherhood] . . . is racist”); Edmonson v. 
Leesville Concrete Co., 500 U.S. 614, 643 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Powers v. Ohio, 499 
U.S. 400, 431 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Columbus Bd. of Educ. v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 485 
(1979) (Powell, J., dissenting); Johnson v. Louisiana, 406 U.S. 356, 378 (1972) (Powell, J., concurring 
in judgment), abrogated by Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390 (2020); Dyson v. Stein, 401 U.S. 
200, 211–12 (1971) (Douglas, J., dissenting).  
Note here that Parents Involved is counted twice, as both Chief Justice John Roberts and Justice 
Thomas use keywords in separate opinions. This was a close call because both Justices use the identi-
cal quote from the Seattle School District’s website to criticize the School District’s definition of 
“cultural racism.” But because two different Justices use the word, I counted it as two references. 
Justice Blackmun’s dissent in Callins is counted here as well as in the unconscious-racism category (a 
subcategory of pointing-out references) and the racism-out-there category because of the different 
usages for the keywords in that opinion. Similarly, Justice O’Connor’s dissent in McCollum, which is 
also counted in the unconscious-racism category, is counted here as well because of her language 
denying that the Court can fix racism. 
201 406 U.S. at 378–79 (Powell, J., concurring in judgment). 
202 443 U.S. at 485 (Powell, J., dissenting). 
203 See Ross, supra note 27, at 302–03 (summarizing Justice’s Powell’s responses in school de-
segregation cases). 
204 Grutter, 539 U.S. at 377 (Thomas, J., concurring in part). 
1300 Boston College Law Review [Vol. 62:1251 
ence because its overall thrust was to show disdain for those who believe that 
structural racism exists in society. 
 Almost half of the references in this category explicitly downplayed the 
Court’s power by stating that the law or the Court cannot fix racism.205 This 
denial of the law’s power, or “power evasiveness” in sociologist Ruth Frank-
enberg’s terms, is a particularly noxious form of judicial obfuscation that de-
nies and forsakes the law’s responsibility for racism.206 Robert Cover refers to 
this paradoxical rhetoric as the “judicial ‘can’t’” because the judge’s rhetoric 
simultaneously recognizes the immorality of the law but insists that the law 
prevents the rectification of it.207 
 The subcategory of references explicitly denying that laws can fix racism 
spanned a wide period of time between 1971 and 2018, but a majority of them 
occurred from 1991–2018, so this idea is more openly expressed in modern 
times. 
 A particularly clear example is Justice O’Connor’s 1991 dissenting opin-
ion in Edmonson v. Leesville Concrete Co., the case that extended Batson to 
civil cases.208 Edmonson involved an African American construction worker 
injured in a workplace accident who sued his company, Leesville, for negli-
gence.209 Leesville used peremptory strikes to remove two Black jurors from 
the jury, leaving a jury comprised of eleven white individuals and one Black 
individual.210 This jury awarded the plaintiff only $18,000, an amount well 
below his medical bills, in part because they found him to be contributorily 
negligent.211 
 In some ways, Justice O’Connor’s reference looks the most sympathetic 
to the harms of racism, but that very quality is what makes it harmful, a rhetor-
ical wolf in sheep’s clothing. Justice O’Connor lulls the reader into thinking 
that a certain result is coming by at first decrying the harm of racism, but then 
abruptly reversing course. The anticlimax of her disappointing conclusion 
along with the explicit repudiation of the law’s power makes this reference 
quite troubling. It is worth here reproducing the entire quote: 
                                                                                                                           
205 See Sellers, 138 S. Ct. at 547, 553 (Thomas, J., dissenting); Ent. Merchs. Ass’n, 564 U.S. at 
799 (Scalia, J., majority opinion); Callins, 410 U.S. at 1154 (Blackmun, J., dissenting from denial of 
certiorari); McCollum, 505 U.S. at 68–69 (O’Connor, J., dissenting); Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 643 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting); Dyson, 401 U.S. at 211–12 (Douglas, J., dissenting). 
206 See RUTH FRANKENBERG, WHITE WOMEN, RACE MATTERS: THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF 
WHITENESS 14–15 (1999) (discussing the struggle between power evasion and “race cognizance”). 
207 ROBERT M. COVER, JUSTICE ACCUSED: ANTISLAVERY AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS, 119–20, 
121 (1975) (noting that “judicial pronouncements of helplessness before the law” were very frequent 
in cases involving slavery). 
208 See 500 U.S. 614, 643–44 (1991) (O’Connor, J., dissenting). 
209 Id. at 616–17 (Kennedy, J., majority opinion). 
210 Id. 
211 Id.; see Brief of Petitioner at 6, id. (No. 89-7743), 1990 WL 10012951. 
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Racism is a terrible thing. It is irrational, destructive, and mean. Ar-
bitrary discrimination based on race is particularly abhorrent when 
manifest in a courtroom, a forum established by the government for 
the resolution of disputes through “quiet rationality.” But not every 
opprobrious and inequitable act is a constitutional violation.212 
 Another example occurred in 2018 in Tharpe v. Sellers, a jury selection 
case involving a sworn affidavit in which a juror admitted to several overtly 
racist ideas about Black people, including revealing that he believed that there 
were “good” Black people and “n[*****]s,” that defendant was not one of the 
“good” Black people, and that he “wondered if Black people even have 
souls.”213 The U.S. District Court for the Western District of Louisiana and the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit had, somewhat inexplicably, found 
that defendant had failed to show the harm caused by the jury service of the 
author of that extraordinary affidavit.214 The Court majority, per curiam, re-
manded the case for reconsideration. In his dissenting opinion, Justice Thomas 
labeled the Court’s act of remanding the case “a useless do-over” and an exer-
cise in “ceremonial handwringing,” suggesting that the Court could not do 
anything that would truly help the defendant avoid execution in this case.215 
F. Blame-Shifting Rhetoric 
 The sixth category covers all the uses of the terms in which the power of 
whiteness is minimized or ignored and blame is shifted to people of color. 
Blame-shifting is a kind of “moral disengagement” in which responsibility for 
a problem is denied and then diverted to a marginalized group.216 It is a psy-
                                                                                                                           
212 Edmonson, 500 U.S. at 643–44 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
213 See 138 S. Ct. 545, 548 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (citation omitted). 
214 See id. at 546 (per curiam). 
215 Id. at 547, 553 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (calling the Court’s remand “pointless” and “useless”). 
But there is also a lot more going on in this passage rhetorically. Like much of Justice Thomas’s rhet-
oric about race, the passage shows a striking disdain for his brethren and their views on race. In the 
last paragraph of his dissent, Justice Thomas muses that “[t]he Court must be disturbed by the racist 
rhetoric in that affidavit, and must want to do something about it.” Id. at 553. He also quotes the 
Court’s characterization of the case as involving “unusual facts.” Id. (quoting id. at 546 (majority 
opinion) (per curiam)). Justice Thomas’s language, including the odd choice of saying “must be dis-
turbed” (not, for example, understandably or naturally disturbed) and placing “unusual facts” in quota-
tions, suggests that Justice Thomas did not find the facts all that unusual or disturbing. One interpreta-
tion of the tone is that Justice Thomas believes that his white colleagues lead lives sheltered from the 
ugliness of racism and so find racism “unusual” and “disturbing.” His disdain for his brethren is also 
apparent in his characterization of the Court’s decision as “no profile in moral courage” and “ceremo-
nial handwringing.” Id. 
216 Clive Hamilton, What History Can Teach Us About Climate Change Denial, in ENGAGING 
WITH CLIMATE CHANGE: PSYCHOANALYTIC AND INTERDISCIPLINARY PERSPECTIVES 19 (Sally 
Weintrobe ed., 2013); see Julie C. Suk, Race Without Cards?, 5 STAN. J. C.R. & C.L. 111, 117 (2009) 
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chological fear response that is designed to protect the self, or a dearly held 
institution, from challenges to morality or basic goodness.217 
 The references in this category are particularly damaging, because in ad-
dition to reifying white innocence, they also specifically reinscribe people of 
color as “bad” people.218 Blame- or power-shifting is a way of controlling dis-
course and keeping others off-balance. It is also a rhetorical fallacy in that it 
does not engage with the argument, but uses anger, blame, or ad hominem at-
tacks as a deflection. 
 There are three different kinds of blame-shifting references in this catego-
ry: (1) references to “reverse racism” and references explicitly extolling the 
notion of “colorblindness” in a way that seeks to defeat racial justice; (2) refer-
ences that depict Black civil rights leaders as irrational, violent, unjust, and/or 
discriminatory; and (3) references that criticize an argument calling out racism 
as uncivil, divisive, or hostile. 
 Blame-shifting references occurred sixteen times.219 An overwhelming 
majority of these references (thirteen) used only the words “racism” or “rac-
ist.” One used all three keywords. And one used “white supremacy” alone, 
                                                                                                                           
(reviewing FORD, supra note 1) (“The ‘race card’ card is played when, in response to the slightest 
allusion to racism, past or present, the speaker is accused of playing the race card, and this new allega-
tion is used to deflect attention away from legitimate complaints of racial justice.”). 
217 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 38 (“Racism has become such a grave incivility and is presumed 
so rare, that accusing someone of racism can be a significant political move.”); Suk, supra note 216, at 
114–16 (someone accused of racism can “feel compelled to do whatever it takes to shake off such an 
odious label”). 
218 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 39–42 (describing the post-racial phenomenon where people of 
color who allege racism are then viewed as the “true racist[s]”). 
219 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1425–27, 1433 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“rac-
ist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy”); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2596 (2019) 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“racist”); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 
2265 n.9 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“racism”); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 
n.15 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“racist”); Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 325, 329 
(2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“racist” and “racism” (citation omitted)); Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 
U.S. 557, 598 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring) (“racist” (citation omitted)); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 
231, 306–07 (2005) (Thomas, J. dissenting) (“racist” and “racism”); Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. 
Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 215 n* (1995) (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (“racism” (quoting Korematsu v. 
United States, 323 U.S. 214, 233 (1944) (Murphy, J. dissenting), abrogated by Trump v. Hawaii, 138 
S. Ct. 2392 (2018))); Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 801 (1994) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“racist” (citation omitted)); Johnson v. Transp. 
Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“racism”); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware 
Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (Stevens, J., majority opinion) (“racist” (citation omitted)); id. at 935–
36 (appendix to majority opinion of Stevens, J.) (same); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897 
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“racist” and “racism”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 
670 n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“racism” (citation omitted)); Fullilove v. Klutznick, 448 U.S. 
448, 522–32 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting) (“racism”); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 
320 (1967) (Stewart, J., majority opinion) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy”). Justice Alito’s dissent in Ramos 
uses all three keywords in the same blame-shifting way, but because this usage was significant in its 
conflation of racism and white supremacy, I counted it as two references. 
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without using “racism” or “racist.” Thus, most of the time, blame-shifting is 
about the labels “racism” or “racist.” “White supremacy,” it seems, is less sus-
ceptible to denial and deflection. 
 All but three of these references were in dissents and concurrences.220 
They spanned a wide period of time from 1967 to 2020, but Justice Stewart’s 
1967 majority opinion was something of a temporal outlier. After Walker v. 
City of Birmingham, the 1967 opinion that depicted civil rights protestors as 
law-breakers, blame-shifting disappeared until 1980.221 The timing of the ref-
erences in this category shows that blame-shifting is a relatively modern rhe-
torical phenomenon. In the 1980s, the Court’s opinions contained five blame-
shifting references to racism, but then in the 1990s the rhetoric slowed down to 
two. Starting in 2005, there was a noticeable uptick, with eight out of the six-
teen blame-shifting references occurring in the fifteen years between 2005 and 
2020. Figure 7 shows the rising trajectory of blame-shifting rhetoric starting in 
the 1980s and the further uptick in the 2000s. 
Figure 7. 
 
                                                                                                                           
 220 See Adarand, 515 U.S. at 215 n* (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (quoting Korematsu, 323 
U.S. at 233 (Murphy, J. dissenting)); Claiborne Hardware, 458 U.S. at 902 (Stevens, J., majority 
opinion); id. at 935–36 (appendix to majority opinion of Stevens, J.); Walker, 388 U.S. at 320 (Stew-
art, J., majority opinion). 
221 388 U.S. at 320. Walker upheld the convictions of civil rights protestors, including Martin Lu-
ther King, Jr., for ignoring Alabama’s injunction against protesting. This reference is in the blame-
shifting category because Justice Stewart supports his decision by analogizing the civil rights protes-
tors to a white supremacist organization that had similarly disobeyed an injunction. See id. 
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 This timeline is consistent with the timelines advanced by Professor Cho 
and Professor Haney López, but the rhetoric reveals some nuances. The first 
cluster of blame-shifting rhetoric started in 1980, a bit earlier than Professor 
Cho’s Post-Civil Rights Era (1986). The very first reference in 1967 also pre-
dates the start of Professor Haney López’s reactionary colorblindness era 
(1979) by a decade. This suggests that the rhetoric started changing before the 
doctrine—that there was a kind of rhetorical foreshadowing of the doctrinal 
problems to come. 
 The other nuance added by this study was the uptick in blame-shifting in 
the 2000s. This suggested a rhetorical—and possibly doctrinal—turn in the 
2000s, in which the Court explicitly denied the existence of racism and further 
that it has become inappropriate and uncivil to call out racism. The rhetoric has 
been turned on its head, so that pointing out racism has become racist.222 
1. Reverse Racism and Colorblindness 
 I categorize a reference as “reverse racism” if the Court or Justices charge 
people of color with racism against white people or argue that affirmative ac-
tion for people of color is racist. There are four references to reverse racism 
that use the word “racist” or “racism.” They begin in 1980 with Justice Stew-
art’s dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick and culminate in 2013 with Justice 
Thomas’s dissent in Fisher v. University of Texas at Austin.”223 
 Reverse racism is a typical kind of passive-aggressive defensive maneu-
ver designed to hide the power of whiteness and turn the blame on those with 
less social power.224 Reverse racism often appears alongside references to the 
notion that the Constitution is colorblind. Used in this way, colorblindness 
serves as a tool “to preserv[e] a status quo of continued white dominance.”225 
As Professor Haney López argues, colorblindness in the Post-Civil Rights Era 
is a purposeful strategy that “provide[s] cover for reactionary opposition to 
racial reform” and is the “strongest rhetorical weapon in the battle against 
race-conscious remedies.”226 Relatedly, Professor Cho discusses the “moral 
                                                                                                                           
222 Haney López, supra note 9, at 829; see Cooper, supra note 1, at 27–30 (explaining that Henry 
Louis Gates, a Black Harvard University professor who was mistaken for a burglar while entering his 
own home, was described as a racist for calling his arrest “racial profiling”). 
223 See Fisher, 570 U.S. at 325, 329 (Thomas, J., concurring) (citation omitted); Adarand Con-
structors, 515 U.S. at 215 n.* (O’Connor, J., majority opinion) (quoting Korematsu, 323 U.S. at 233 
(Murphy, J. dissenting)); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. at 677 (Scalia, J., dissenting); Fullilove, 
448 U.S. at 532 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
224 Reverse racism is an interesting phrase in that it suggests that racism flows—or should flow—
in only one direction. See DIANGELO, supra note 9, at 24. 
225 Haney López, supra note 9, at 828. 
226 IAN F. HANEY LÓPEZ, WHITE BY LAW: THE LEGAL CONSTRUCTION OF RACE 158 (rev. ed. 
2006). 
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equivalence” move of post-racialism, wherein racism becomes the moral 
equivalent of strategies to stop racism.227 Sociologist Ruth Frankenberg calls 
colorblindness “a double move toward power evasiveness and color evasive-
ness.”228 She refuses to use the term “colorblind” because it suggests passivity; 
in her view, colorblindness is a specific, deliberate strategy used by white peo-
ple to avoid acknowledging racism.229 
 In the affirmative action context, several of the opinions that reference 
reverse racism show starkly how the concept of colorblindness has been 
weaponized. For example, Justice Scalia’s 1987 dissent in Johnson v. Trans-
portation Agency, the first Supreme Court case addressing gender-based af-
firmative action, attacked the Court for “convert[ing]” Title VII, turning “[a] 
statute designed to establish a color-blind and gender-blind workplace . . . into 
a powerful engine of racism and sexism.”230 Justice Scalia condemned the 
Court for failing “the Johnsons of the country,” labeling it an “irony” that they 
“suffer this injustice at the hands of a Court fond of thinking itself the champi-
on of the politically impotent.”231 The opinion exhibits Justice Scalia’s trade-
mark rhetorical flair, using the colorful term “inverted,” a term that means up-
side down and inside out, but also an archaic word for homosexuality.232 Simi-
larly, the metaphor of “a powerful engine” connotes something large and un-
stoppable that will run over “the Johnsons of the country.” 
 Justice Stewart’s 1980 dissent in Fullilove v. Klutznick, an Equal Protec-
tion Clause case centered around a congressional spending program, was not 
as rhetorically skillful, but neatly encapsulated how reverse racism and color-
blindness work in tandem to bolster white innocence and undercut remedies 
for discrimination.233 Justice Stewart’s dissent criticized the majority opinion 
that minority set-asides are a constitutional exercise of congressional power: 
“There are those who think that we need a new Constitution, and their views 
                                                                                                                           
227 See Cho, supra note 20, at 1600, 1603, 1620–26 (noting that post-racialism has four central 
features, one of which is moral equivalence). 
228 FRANKENBERG, supra note 206, at 14, 15. 
229 See id. at 142–43. 
230 480 U.S. 616, 677 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
231 Id. 
232 See id.; Alex Bollinger, 5 Old-Timey Words for Gay, Lesbian, & Bi People That You Should 
Know, LGBTQ NATION (Oct. 8, 2017), https://www.lgbtqnation.com/2017/10/5-old-timey-words-
gay-lesbian-bi-people-know/2/ [https://perma.cc/JV93-N3ZE]. Justice Scalia was such a master rhe-
torician that I believe he must have seen the sexual connotations of both the word “inverted” and the 
phrase “the Johnsons of the country.” In particular, Justice Scalia’s use of “inverted” in a case about 
women seeking what many think of as a “man’s” job reads like a linguistic code for the fear that deci-
sions like Johnson will turn women into men and men into sissies. See Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 
480 U.S. at 677. 
233 See 448 U.S. 448, 522–32 (1980) (Stewart, J., dissenting); Simson, supra note 27, at 639–41 
(defining the concept of whiteness as innocence). 
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may someday prevail. But under the Constitution we have, one practice in 
which government may never engage is the practice of racism—not even 
‘temporarily,’ and not even as an ‘experiment.’”234 Unlike Justice Scalia’s 
more acerbic writing, Justice Stewart’s dissent has a folksy, nostalgic feeling to 
it. At the same time, the reference has an ominous feel, not unlike Justice Scal-
ia’s warning to “the Johnsons of the country.” Justice Stewart was afraid that 
those who think we need a new Constitution “may someday prevail.” 
2. Discrediting Black Civil Rights Leaders 
 The second kind of blame-shifting references portray Black civil rights 
leaders as violent or racist.235 It is a close cousin of charging “reverse racism” 
but is more directly ad hominem. Professor Haney López notes this political 
strategy as starting as soon as the civil rights movement began.236 My data 
supports this, showing how the rhetoric moved from the political branches 
(Congress and the Executive) to become enshrined in the law by the Supreme 
Court. 
 Two of the references, one by Justice John Paul Stevens and one by Jus-
tice Scalia, quote similar passages from the rhetoric of American politician 
Charles Evers, a nationally known civil rights leader and organizer and the 
brother of civil rights activist Medgar Evers.237 These references span a wide 
timeline from 1967 (Walker v. City of Birmingham) to 2009 (Ricci v. DeStefa-
no), demonstrating that this category reflects a long, enduring image of Black 
men as violent and criminal, and a key rhetorical strategy for undercutting the 
credibility of civil rights leaders. 
 Justice Stevens’s 1982 majority opinion in NAACP v. Claiborne Hard-
ware Co., for example, quoted Charles Evers’s fiery rhetoric in the opinion and 
reproduced at length in the appendix.238 The case was about white merchants 
who complained about vandalism and violence resulting from the NAACP 
                                                                                                                           
234 Fullilove, 448 U.S. at 532 (Stewart, J., dissenting). 
235 See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 598 (2009) (Alito, J., concurring); Madsen v. Women’s 
Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 753, 801 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); NAACP v. Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. 886, 902 (1982) (Stevens, J., majority opinion); 
id. at 935–36 (appendix to majority opinion of Stevens, J.); Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897 
(1982) (Powell, J., dissenting); Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 320 (1967) (Stewart, J., 
majority opinion). 
236 See Haney López, supra note 9, at 812–13. 
237 See Madsen, 512 U.S. at 800–01 (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in 
part); Claiborne Hardware Co., 458 U.S. at 902 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); see also ARAM 
GOUDSOUZIAN, DOWN TO THE CROSSROADS: CIVIL RIGHTS, BLACK POWER, AND THE MEREDITH 
MARCH AGAINST FEAR 72–75 (2014) (describing Charles Evers’s civil rights organizing). 
238 See 458 U.S. at 902 (Stevens, J., majority opinion); id. at 935–36 (appendix to majority opin-
ion of Stevens, J.). 
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boycotts of white businesses. Claiborne held that the economic boycotts of 
white merchants in Mississippi by the NAACP were protected First Amend-
ment activity.239 Claiborne was an important doctrinal victory for civil rights, 
but the opinion’s use of the word “racist” in the opinion is problematic. The 
entire case was about Black individuals boycotting racist white merchants in 
Mississippi, yet Justice Stevens never used the word “racism” in the opinion to 
condemn the behavior of the merchants. 
 Instead, Justice Stevens’s only references to racism were quotes from 
Black civil rights leaders and protestors, including Evers. For example, Justice 
Stevens quoted Evers as saying, “[i]f we catch any of you going in any of them 
racist stores, we’re gonna break your damn neck.”240 The Court’s reproduction 
of Evers’s speech in a lengthy appendix to the opinion was also unusual. The 
speech painted the NAACP and civil rights protestors in a way likely to trigger 
white fear and fragility. 
 Indeed, twelve years after Claiborne, Justice Scalia used the material in 
the appendix in 1994 in Madsen v. Women’s Health Center, Inc. to paint civil 
rights protestors as thuggish and violent.241 The sole purpose of this reference 
was to use civil rights protestors as a foil to the (allegedly) more peaceful, law-
abiding anti-abortion protestors.242 
 Though it did not involve Evers, Justice Samuel Alito’s concurring opin-
ion in Ricci v. DeStefano used the term “racist” similarly, applying it to a Black 
civil rights leader.243 There, the Court addressed whether the city of New Ha-
ven improperly discarded the results of a qualifying examination for promotion 
in the city’s fire department after recognizing that white and Hispanic fire-
fighters significantly outperformed Black candidates.244 The majority opinion 
concluded that the city’s actions were improper unless it could provide a valid 
defense on remand.245 Justice Alito wrote separately for the singular purpose of 
charging that New Haven adopted the affirmative action plan because the New 
Haven mayor feared alienating a “politically powerful” Black preacher who 
                                                                                                                           
239 Id. at 926–27. 
240 Id. at 902. 
241 512 U.S. 753, 800–01 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
242 This means that this reference also bleeds into the seventh category, comparator references. 
Nevertheless, it is primarily blame-shifting because the substantive purpose and effect of the passage 
is to show Charles Evers and the boycotters to be violent and retaliatory. Justice Scalia cherry-picks 
among the worst of Evers’s rhetoric and the boycott facts to show how the Court treats civil rights 
protesters better than it treats “the disfavored class of abortion protesters.” Id. at 800. Justice Scalia’s 
point is that the Court indulges the behavior of Black people, even violent ones, while condemning 
good white (Christian) abortion protestors. 
243 Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 562–63 (2009). 
244 Id. at 562–63.  
245 Id. at 579. 
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called any white person “racist if they question[ed] his actions.”246 This refer-
ence depicted the Black preacher as bringing an entire city to heel by “playing 
the race card.”247 Justice Alito’s language paints a picture of a world in which 
Black people command outsized political power wielded by labeling white 
people  “racist.”248 
 Another reference occurred in 1982 in Board of Education v. Pico, a plu-
rality opinion addressing whether a local school board had violated students’ 
First Amendment rights in removing books it deemed antithetical to its reli-
gious and political views. Justice Powell’s opinion was subtle but still worth 
mentioning because it reflects white fear of Black people.249 In his dissent, Jus-
tice Powell argued that the Constitution allows school districts to ban books 
that are “vulgar or racist” or that “promote ideas and values repugnant to a 
democratic society” or “teach such values to children.” 250 Justice Powell listed 
the books that fall within these parameters, along with selected quotes in an 
appendix to his dissent. A significant number of books on that list were works 
by lauded Black authors.251 Although it is unclear if Justice Powell included 
them because he thought they were racist as opposed to vulgar, the inclusion of 
so many works by esteemed Black writers as well as an entire anthology by 
Black writers starkly portrayed African Americans in a negative light. 
3. Calling Out Racism as Uncivil 
 The third kind of blame-shifting references rail against the use of the 
word “racist” or “racism” as uncivil, intemperate, or hurtful to the country. 
Other versions of this subcategory accuse people of seeing racism where none 
                                                                                                                           
246 Id. at 598 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted). 
247 See Cooper, supra note 1, at 35–39 (citation omitted); see also id. at 38 (“Persons who per-
ceive themselves accused of racism may in turn accuse their interlocutors of ‘playing the race card.’ 
They play the ‘retaliatory “race card” card.’ ‘The “race card” card is played to avoid engaging the 
merits of a claim of racial prejudice or injustice.’” (citations omitted)). 
248 See Ricci, 575 U.S. at 598 (Alito, J., concurring) (citation omitted).  
249 See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 897 (1982) (Powell, J., dissenting). 
250 Id. (emphasis omitted). 
251 See id. at 897–98, 902 (appendix to opinion of Powell, J., dissenting). The list prohibited 
works written by well-known African American writers like Alice Childress, Richard Wright, and 
Eldridge Cleaver. The list also banned “The Best Short Stories by Negro Writers,” an anthology edit-
ed Langston Hughes. Id. at 897–902. Both Wright and Hughes were Guggenheim Fellows, an honor 
awarded to those “who have already demonstrated exceptional capacity for productive scholarship or 
exceptional creative ability in the arts,” and the latter was also inducted into the National Institute of 
Arts and Letters. About the Fellowship, JOHN SIMON GUGGENHEIM MEM’L FOUND., https://www.gf.
org/about/fellowship/ [https://perma.cc/L2C9-M8DK]. A few award-winning white authors like Kurt 
Vonnegut, Jr. and Bernard Malamud were also included on Justice Powell’s list. Pico, 457 U.S. at 
897–98, 902. 
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exists and “playing the race card” as a political “dirty trick.”252 They are 
grounded in white innocence and the ideology that white supremacy is the re-
sult of normal societal operations like merit and talent.253 And, they turn the 
rhetoric of racism on its head so that the real racists become the people who 
call out racism.254 
 There are seven references in this subcategory; all of them included the 
words “racism” or “racist” and one (by Justice Alito in Ramos) used all three 
keywords.255 The numbers thus suggest that “racism” and “racist” are the pri-
mary trigger words for the backlash response.256 All of these references oc-
curred in separate opinions, mostly dissents. 
 The most disturbing trend here is timing. References angrily objecting to 
charges of racism as uncivil or damaging to American culture are on a clear 
upswing. The first reference, by Justice Powell, appeared in 1980 and the last, 
by Justice Alito, in 2020. Justice Powell’s 1980 reference was the weakest rhe-
torically (and in a footnote); it was also a temporal outlier, coming twenty-five 
years or more before the other references.257 The other references in this cate-
                                                                                                                           
252 See Cho, supra note 20, at 1602–03, 1634–36; Cooper, supra note 1, at 36, 39. 
253 Cooper, supra note 1, at 35 (building upon Professor Haney López’s argument––that centuries 
of linking crime control to race has led to a belief that major institutions are racially equitable—by 
suggesting that the perceived lack of explicit racism encourages individuals to view any residual racial 
disparities as natural or inevitable (citing Haney López, supra note 36, at 1063–64)). 
254 See Cho, supra note 20, at 1595, 1635–36 (“Under post-racialism . . . . one who points out ra-
cial inequities risks being characterized as an obsessed-with-race racist . . . .”); Cooper, supra note 1, 
at 39–42 (applying critical race theory to the Gates controversy to demonstrate how colorblindness 
and post-racialism make it easier to see those who call out racial injustice as the “[t]rue” racists). 
255 See Ramos v. Louisiana, 140 S. Ct. 1390, 1425–27, 1433 (2020) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“rac-
ist,” “racism,” and “white supremacy”); Dep’t of Com. v. New York, 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2596 (2019) 
(Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (“racist”); Flowers v. Mississippi, 139 S. Ct. 2228, 
2265 n.9 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“racism”); Peña-Rodriguez v. Colorado, 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 
n.15 (2017) (Alito, J., dissenting) (“racist”); Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 306–07 (2005) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (“racist” and “racism”); Owen v. City of Independence, 445 U.S. 622, 670 
n.11 (1980) (Powell, J., dissenting) (“racism” (citation omitted)). 
256 Justice Alito’s dissenting opinion in Ramos uses all the keywords to mean essentially the same 
thing. This is interesting because although there is overlap between “racism” and “white supremacy,” 
the Court’s usage of these terms is not always the same. For example, “white supremacy” covers nar-
rower ground (judging by the rarity of its usage) and is more intentional and therefore easily identifia-
ble (judging by the absence of the phrase in racism-out-there references and the fact that we never talk 
about “unconscious” white supremacy). But Justice Alito’s conflation of the meanings of the key-
words serves his rhetorical purposes. By conflating them, the narrower and more intentional “white 
supremacy” is equated with racism and makes his reductio ad absurdum argument (are all these peo-
ple really white supremacists?) stronger. 
257 In Owen, Justice Powell refers to “ruinous judgments” that “imperil local governments,” elab-
orating in a footnote that the $500,000 judgment involved a municipality that had removed a police 
officer, without due process, for “racism and brutality.” 445 U.S. at 670 & n.11. Although certainly 
not as direct or powerful as Justice Alito’s rhetoric, I placed this reference in the blame-shifting cate-
gory because the choice of that particular example implies that antiracism efforts were the cause of the 
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gory occurred in the 2000s, and the majority occurred in the brief, recent peri-
od between 2017 and 2020. In addition to the uptick in frequency, the condem-
natory rhetoric of these references is becoming stronger and more vituperative. 
 Of the references in the 2000s, the most recent, Justice Alito’s 2020 refer-
ence in Ramos v. Louisiana, was the strongest and most accusatory in tone. 
This opinion contained some of his most passionate judicial writing and re-
flected his anger at the use of the word “racism” by the other Justices. In his 
dissent, Justice Alito castigated his brethren for what he characterized as ad 
hominem rhetoric that “add[s] insult to injury” and “tars Louisiana and Oregon 
with the charge of racism for permitting nonunanimous verdicts.”258 The anger 
in the writing is palpable, particularly in the charge of ad hominem rhetoric 
(Alito is clearly referring to the “abusive” ad hominem) and the tarring meta-
phor.259 The association of tarring with vigilantism made clear that Justice 
Alito saw the charge of racism as a form of mob vengeance. 
 But that was not the end of Justice Alito’s rebuke of the Court. Justice 
Alito’s rhetoric built as he decried the injustice that the majority inflicts on 
Louisiana and Oregon: 
Some years ago the British Parliament enacted a law allowing non-
unanimous verdicts. Was Parliament under the sway of the Klan? 
The Constitution of Puerto Rico permits non-unanimous verdicts. 
Were the framers of that Constitution racists? Non-unanimous ver-
dicts were once advocated by the American Law Institute and the 
American Bar Association. Was their aim to promote white suprem-
acy? And how about the prominent scholars who have taken the 
same position? Racists all? Of course not. So all the talk about the 
Klan, etc., is entirely out of place. We should set an example of ra-
                                                                                                                           
“ruinous judgments.” The only words Justice Powell chose to put in quotations in the passage are the 
words “racism and brutality,” as if to suggest disbelief or skepticism. 
258 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting). 
259 In the “abusive” ad hominem argument, the arguer tries to shut down the argument by attack-
ing the speaker personally, not the argument itself. See DOUGLAS WALTON, AD HOMINEM ARGU-
MENTS 2–4 (1998). The abusive ad hominem thus attempts to deny the speaker the freedom to ad-
vance an argument based on the speaker’s personal characteristics. See Frans H. van Eemeren et al., 
The Disguised Abusive Ad Hominem Empirically Investigated: Strategic Manoeuvring with Direct 
Personal Attacks, 18 THINKING & REASONING 344, 346–47, 350 (2012). This type of ad hominem 
violates several of the rules of argumentation, is often considered fallacious and many also consider it 
unprincipled. See id. at 346–47, 350 (noting that “abusive ad hominem shuts down the discussion 
before it really starts” and therefore violates the “Freedom Rule” of argumentation). Tarring is a colo-
nial (and feudal) form of public torture and punishment that involves painting a person with hot wood 
tar. Janet Burns, A Brief, Sticky History of Tarring and Feathering, MENTAL FLOSS (Aug. 6, 2015), 
https://www.mentalfloss.com/article/66830/brief-sticky-history-tarring-and-feathering [https://perma.
cc/W5FJ-TKX4].  
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tional and civil discourse instead of contributing to the worst current 
trends. . . . Now to what matters.260 
The tone of this paragraph is rhetorically fascinating. The use of the rhetorical 
questions to create irony, coupled with the parallelism, adds to the contemptu-
ous and aggressive tone of the passage. Similarly, the argumentum ad absur-
dum and appeal to extremes creates a defiant and combative tone; Justice Alito 
challenged, even dared, the Court (and the reader) to label these venerable 
people and institutions racist. The series of questions is a rhetorical shove to 
the chest. When Justice Alito eventually gave the reader the answer, even his 
answer was laden with contempt: “Of course not.”261 Similarly, the words 
“[n]ow to what matters” imply that issues of racism and the law are silly tri-
fles.262 Shame on you, Justice Alito was saying, for “contributing to the worst 
current trends.”263 
 Justice Alito was similarly outraged in his opinion in Department of 
Commerce v. New York, a 2019 case addressing the reinstatement of a citizen-
ship question on the then-upcoming census questionnaire.264 Again, he decried 
the charge of racism that surrounds the case, lamenting that: 
It is a sign of our time that the inclusion of a question about citizen-
ship on the census has become a subject of bitter public controversy 
and has led to today’s regrettable decision. While the decision to 
place such a question on the 2020 census questionnaire is attacked 
as racist, there is a broad international consensus that inquiring 
about citizenship on a census is not just appropriate but advisable.265 
His rhetoric was softer here, but Justice Alito still regarded it as an unfortunate 
“sign of our time” that something with “broad international consensus” could 
be seen as “racist.” He blamed the Court’s “regrettable decision” and the “bit-
ter public controversy” not on racism itself, but on the baseless charge of rac-
ism. The references to time in both opinions made clear that Justice Alito be-
lieved that things were better before the Court started using the word “racist” 
so much.266 
                                                                                                                           
260 Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1427 (Alito, J., dissenting) (footnotes omitted). 
261 See id. (emphasis added). 
262 See id. 
263 See id. 
264 See 139 S. Ct. 2551, 2596 (2019) (Alito, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). 
265 Id. 
266 The third reference by Justice Alito occurs in a footnote in 2017 in Peña-Rodriguez v. Colora-
do and straddles both this category and the comparator category. 137 S. Ct. 855, 884 n.15 (2017) 
(Alito, J., dissenting). In his dissent, Justice Alito spins a number of hypothetical problems with the 
majority’s singling-out of racism as a particular societal problem. Among other things, he worries that 
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 The other references in this category are less rhetorically interesting but 
show the clear backlash against the words “racism” and “racist.” In 2005 in 
Miller-El v. Dretke, Justice Thomas scolded the majority for “simply as-
sum[ing] that all Dallas County prosecutors were racist and remained that way 
through the mid-1980’s.”267 Justice Thomas used the word “racism” in the 
same way in 2019 in his dissent in Flowers v. Mississippi.268 Justice Thomas 
chastised the majority for “blithely imput[ing] single-minded racism to others” 
because it “cheapens actual cases of discrimination.”269 The blithe imputation 
that Justice Thomas was referring to involved the prosecution’s striking of for-
ty-one of the forty-two Black jurors in a case that the Mississippi Supreme 
Court termed “as strong a prima facie case of racial discrimination as we have 
ever seen in the context of a Batson challenge.”270 
G. Use of Racism as a Comparator 
 The final category contains references that use “racist,” “racism,” or 
“white supremacy” as a comparator. The references define these terms only as 
they compare to something else or use them hypothetically. The most common 
rhetorical uses in this category are “racism” or “white supremacy” as a hypo-
thetical or as an analogy. Thirteen references to “racist” or “racism” and six 
references to “white supremacy” fall into this category, for a total of nineteen 
references.271 
                                                                                                                           
attorneys will illegally attempt to contact jurors in an effort to find evidence of racism that can over-
turn a conviction. Id. 
267 Miller-El v. Dretke, 545 U.S. 231, 305–06 (2005) (Thomas, J., dissenting). Like Justice Alito, 
Justice Thomas uses the verb “tars” to describe the majority’s insult to Dallas prosecutors and treats 
the majority’s charge of racism as spurious. See Ramos, 140 S. Ct. at 1425 (Alito, J., dissenting); 
Miller-El, 545 U.S. at 305 (Thomas, J., dissenting).  
268 See 139 S. Ct. 2228, 2265 n.9 (2019) (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
269 Id. at 2265 n.9. 
270 Compare id. at 2235, 2237, 2245 (majority opinion) (emphasizing this position), with id. at 
2267 n.10 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (taking issue with the majority’s characterization). 
271 See Abbott v. Perez, 138 S. Ct. 2305, 2325 (2018) (Alito, J., majority opinion) (“white su-
premacy”); Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Alito, J., majority opinion) (“racists”); Ober-
gefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2614 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy” 
(citation omitted)); id. at 2636 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“white supremacy” (citation omitted)); 
Crawford v. Metro. Gov’t, 555 U.S. 271, 276 (2009) (Souter, J., majority opinion) (“racist”); Wash. 
State Grange v. Wash. State Republican Party, 552 U.S. 442, 468 (2008) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“rac-
ist”); Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 371 (2007) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and concurring in 
judgment) (“racist”); Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 427 (2006) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“racist” 
(citation omitted)); Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“[w]hite 
[s]upremacy” (citation omitted)); Virginia v. Black, 538 U.S. 343, 381–84 (2003) (Souter, J., concur-
ring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (“[w]hite [s]upremacy” (citation omitted)); Hill v. 
Colorado, 530 U.S. 703, 724 (2000) (Stevens, J., majority opinion) (“racist” (citation omitted)); Cal. 
Democratic Party v. Jones, 530 U.S. 567, 593 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (“white supremacy”); id. 
(“racist”); Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 79 n.4 (2000) (Souter, J., concurring in judgment) (“rac-
 
2021] The Rhetoric of Racism in the United States Supreme Court 1313 
 Like some of the other categories, racism as a comparator is a relatively 
modern phenomenon, appearing for the first time in 1993; white supremacy as 
a comparator does not appear until 2000. But the references in the 1990s were 
minimal; overall, comparator racism peaked in the 2000s, with the vast majori-
ty of references appearing in the years between 2000 and 2018.272 There were 
more concurring and dissenting opinions in this category than majority opin-
ions overall, but no timing or other pattern emerged in terms of separate versus 
majority opinions. 
 Some of the references that I chose to put in other categories also used 
racism as a comparator. What differentiated the comparator references is the 
comparison was the primary thrust of the usage. The usage of the keywords in 
these references was predominantly a means of making a point about some-
thing else. The use of the keywords is unnecessary and not germane to the le-
gal issue in the case. For example, only three of the references in this category 
involved cases in which race was a central issue.273 Because race was not a 
central issue in most of these cases, it is important to ask why racism or white 
                                                                                                                           
ist” (citation omitted)); Denver Area Educ. Telecomms. Consortium, Inc. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 806 
(1996) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part, concurring in judgment in part, and dissenting in part) (“rac-
ist”); Bd. of Cnty. Comm’rs v. Umbehr, 518 U.S. 668, 700 (1996) (Scalia, J., dissenting) (“racist”); 
Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Va., 515 U.S. 819, 831 (1995) (Kennedy, J., majori-
ty opinion) (using “racism” in a hypothetical); id. at 899 (Souter, J., dissenting) (“racism”); Bray v. 
Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic, 506 U.S. 263, 274 (1993) (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (“rac-
ism”). Notably, four of the nineteen total references in this category come from just two cases. In 
Obergefell, both Chief Justice Roberts and Justice Thomas used the phrase “white supremacy,” result-
ing in two separate references. See 135 S. Ct. at 2614 (2015) (Roberts, C.J., dissenting); id. at 2636 
n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). Additionally, in California Democratic Party v. Jones, Justice Stevens 
used both the word “racist” and the phrase “white supremacy” in his hypotheticals. See 530 U.S. at 
593 (Stevens, J., dissenting). Although it is unclear whether Justice Stevens was using “racist” and 
“white supremacy” to mean the same or different things, I counted this as two references. By contrast, 
in Rosenberger, both Justice Anthony Kennedy and Justice Souter used the word “racism” several 
times to describe the topic of the Christian literature at issue in the case. See, e.g., 515 U.S. at 831 
(Kennedy, J., majority opinion); id. at 899 (Souter, J., dissenting). I counted the separate opinions as 
two references, even though “racism” was used several times in each opinion. Because the usage in 
these references was simply echoing the description in the literature itself, I did not count the multiple 
uses in the opinions as a separate references. Finally, Justice Souter’s use of “white supremacy” to 
refer to cross-burning and the Klan in his opinion in Black is counted as a comparator (and not a usu-
al-suspect) reference because the references are phrased as hypotheticals. See Black, 538 U.S. at 383–
84 (Souter, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part). 
272 See supra note 271 and accompanying text. 
273 See Abbott, 138 S. Ct. at 2330 (evaluating whether the state of Texas had used unconstitutional 
gerrymandering to dilute the voting power of Latinos and African Americans when it redrew its dis-
tricts in response to the 2010 census results); Matal, 137 S. Ct. at 1751 (reviewing whether an Asian 
American rock band could trademark their moniker “THE SLANTS”); Black, 538 U.S. at 384–87 
(considering whether a statute prohibiting cross-burning done with the intent to intimidate others vio-
lates the First Amendment). All but one of the references are by white Justices. The only African 
American Justice to make a comparator reference is Justice Thomas in Obergefell. See 135 S. Ct. at 
2636 n.5 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
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supremacy was raised at all, and what rhetorical work the keywords were do-
ing in these references.  
 The references fell loosely into three subcategories: using racism to deny 
remedies to others (usually women); twisting or deflecting the harms of rac-
ism; and extolling the tolerance of racism as a positive. 
1. Using Racism to Deny Remedies to Women and Gay People 
 The references to racism in this subcategory tend to use “racism” as an 
extreme example of “how bad things are” for Black people, as a way of deny-
ing that others experienced harm.274 In many of these examples, a Justice re-
sists a remedial outcome by noting that the situation is simply not “as bad” as 
racism. This rhetorical sleight of hand simultaneously pays lip service to the 
notion of racism as a terrible thing while using it as a way to deprive others of 
rights.275 
 Using racism as a foil in sex-discrimination cases to deny or minimize the 
harm of sex discrimination was a signature move for Justice Scalia.276 For ex-
ample, in 1993 in Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Center, Justice Scalia 
used a comparison to racism to dismiss the notion that the behavior of anti-
abortion activists is based in animosity toward women as a class.277 In Justice 
                                                                                                                           
274 Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 596 
(1990) (“Silent and suffering, [Black women] are trotted onto the page . . . as the ultimate example of 
how bad things are.”). 
275 I say “lip service” because the references using racism to deny remedies to others often come 
from Justices who otherwise tend to disfavor laws, like affirmative action, designed to alleviate racism 
and/or who appear in the denying/minimizing category in this Article. See supra Part III.E. In this 
way, the Justices who use this tactic magnify the harm of racism when it allows them to deny rights to 
others, but downplay racism when race discrimination is the central issue. Compare Bray, 506 U.S. at 
274 (Scalia, J., majority opinion) (comparing anti-abortion protestors to racists is inappropriate be-
cause racism is much worse than what the anti-abortion protestors do to women), with Anemona 
Hartocollis, With Remarks in Affirmative Action Case, Scalia Steps into ‘Mismatch’ Debate, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 10, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/12/11/us/with-remarks-in-affirmative-action-
case-scalia-steps-into-mismatch-debate.html [https://perma.cc/BY8Q-WSHE] (noting Justice Scalia’s 
remarks during argument in the Fisher v. University of Texas case that Black students should maybe 
go to “slower track school[s]”). Compare also Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2636 n.5 (2015) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting) (insulting to compare homophobia to racism, implying racism is much 
worse), with Fisher v. Univ. of Tex. at Austin, 570 U.S. 297, 315 (2013) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(arguing that Court should have held that any affirmative action in higher education is prohibited), 
and Tharpe v. Sellars, 138 S. Ct. 545, 548 (2018) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (severely criticizing Court’s 
remanding of capital case against Black defendant because of juror racism).  
276 See, e.g., Bray, 506 U.S. at 274 (Scalia, J., majority opinion).  
277 See id. Justice Scalia used a similar tactic in two other cases about women’s equality that were 
instead included in the blame-shifting category. See Madsen v. Women’s Health Ctr., Inc., 512 U.S. 
753, 800–01 (1994) (Scalia, J., concurring in judgment in part and dissenting in part) (portraying civil 
rights protestors as violent thugs in an attempt to make anti-abortion protestors appear law-abiding 
and more peaceful); Johnson v. Transp. Agency, 480 U.S. 616, 660 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting) 
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Scalia’s view, the anti-abortion protestors, whose tactics included blocking en-
trances and exits to the clinics, strewing nails in the parking lot, and vandaliz-
ing the clinic building, did “not remotely qualify for such harsh description, 
and for such derogatory association with racism.”278 It is unclear whether 
Black women exist for Justice Scalia, because the reference suggests that rac-
ism and misogyny can be neatly severed.279 At no point did Justice Scalia con-
sider whether the women using the abortion clinic might be Black. 
 Similarly, white supremacy is used as a comparator in two modern gay 
civil rights cases.280 The comparator usage in the cases is similar to the usage 
in the sex-discrimination cases and, indeed, Justice Scalia is the author of one 
of the references. In both cases, the argument is that white supremacy is not 
comparable to heteronormativity. Justice Thomas put the point most strongly 
in 2015 in Obergefell v. Hodges, writing that the comparison between anti-
miscegenation statutes and laws prohibiting gay marriage was “both offensive 
and inaccurate” because the laws do not share the “sordid history” of slav-
ery.281 Justice Thomas does not mention the extensive history of discrimination 
and violence against gays, including, in some countries, the criminalization of 
their very existence and then refers to slavery as if to suggest that LGBT+ in-
dividuals do not need legal protection.282 
2. Distorting the Harm of Racism Through Hypotheticals 
 In the second subcategory, Supreme Court Justices refer to racism as a 
way of sidestepping or twisting its harms. They typically do this by way of 
hypothetical examples, which add drama rhetorically but are generally consid-
                                                                                                                           
(suggesting that individuals who are often racially discriminated against will be harmed by the majori-
ty’s decision to uphold a gender-based affirmative action plan). 
278 Bray, 506 U.S. at 274. 
279 See generally Kimberle Crenshaw, Demarginalizing the Intersection of Race and Sex: A Black 
Feminist Critique of Antidiscrimination Doctrine, Feminist Theory and Antiracist Politics, 1989 U. CHI. 
LEGAL F. 139, https://chicagounbound.uchicago.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1052&context=uclf 
[https://perma.cc/X9HY-3H2H] (discussing the intersectionality of race and gender). 
280 See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. at 2636 n.5 (2015) (Thomas, J., dissenting); Lawrence v. 
Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 600 (2003) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
281 135 S. Ct. at 2636 n.5. Justice Thomas’s point is that anti-miscegenation laws were created 
hand-in-hand with laws permitting slavery, so the comparison between anti-miscegenation laws and 
laws prohibiting gay marriage are akin to comparing the treatment of gay people to slavery. For Jus-
tice Thomas, the underlying comparison (treatment of gay people to treatment of Black people under 
slavery) is implied by the overarching one (gay marriage to interracial marriage). For this reason, 
Justice Thomas finds the analogy “offensive and inaccurate.” Id. 
282 See Lucy Rodgers et al., Where Is It Illegal to Be Gay?, BBC NEWS (Feb. 10, 2014), https://
www.bbc.com/news/world-25927595 [https://perma.cc/VV4J-RS52] (summarizing the legal status of 
same-sex relationships in each country). 
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ered unpersuasive because they are not real examples; the further the hypothet-
ical is from reality, the less persuasive it is.283 
 For example, it was a common tactic of Justice Scalia’s to trot out race as 
a strawman or hypothetical to score a point. Often for Justice Scalia, racism 
was an intensifier that could be used to show the silly or harmful consequences 
of a law.284 For example, in 2008 in Washington State Grange v. Washington 
Republican Party, the Court upheld a law allowing candidates to select the 
political party that would appear next to their name on a voting ballot.285 The 
Washington Republican Party had sued, arguing that the law violated the Par-
ty’s associational rights by depriving the Party of the right to choose the candi-
dates with which the Party would be associated.286 Justice Scalia’s hypothetical 
in his dissent involved a “notorious and despised racist” who chooses to be on 
the ballot under the banner of a political party that disavows him, thus dis-
torting and ruining the “image” of that political party.287 The use of racism here 
is an appeal to extremes designed to make the consequences of the Court’s de-
cision seem ridiculous.288 Justice Scalia’s hypothetical shifts the harm of rac-
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rise in hate crimes during Trump’s presidency as evidence of Trump’s racism). Given the Party’s 
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at 470 (Scalia, J., dissenting).  
287 Wash. State Grange, 552 U.S. at 468. Justice Scalia uses a similar rhetorical tactic in Rita v. 
United States, a case involving the sentencing guidelines. See 551 U.S. 338, 371 (2007) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in judgment). He describes an elaborate hypothetical involving two 
brothers, one “racist” and one “nonracist,” who rob a bank. Id. 
288 An appeal to extremes is a fallacious argument strategy in which the extreme is used to make 
an otherwise reasonable argument look absurd. BO BENNETT, LOGICALLY FALLACIOUS: THE ULTI-
MATE COLLECTION OF OVER 300 LOGICAL FALLACIES 84–85 (2017). 
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ism so that the “victim” is a powerful political party that has ample resources 
to remediate its image and its message. 
 Similarly, in 2017 in Matal v. Tam, a case in which an Asian American 
rock band attempted to reclaim a racist slur by trademarking their name, “THE 
SLANTS,” Justice Alito used a hypothetical about racism that distorted histo-
ry. It used racism (and sexism and homophobia) to support the Court’s decision 
to strike down the disparagement clause of the Lanham Act.289 Justice Alito 
noted that the clause was not “narrowly drawn” because it would also apply to 
trademarks such as “Down with racists,” “Down with sexists,” “Down with 
homophobes,” and “Slavery is an evil institution.”290 But Justice Alito’s use of 
race here, like Justice Scalia’s in Washington Republican Party, was a clever 
rhetorical tool. Justice Alito turned this argument back on its proponents by 
writing as though the history of race in this country was one of people desper-
ately trying to trademark signs like “Down with racism” instead of the reality 
of our history, which is replete with signs like “No Dogs N****s Mexicans” 
and “Positively No Filipinos Allowed.”291 
3. Tolerance of Racism Is What Makes This Country Great 
 References from the third subcategory show a kind of legal and cultural 
pride in the American constitutional commitment to free speech by picking the 
most extreme and repugnant examples of racism and noting that they would be 
protected speech. It is a version of the fallacious appeal to extremes. These 
references accept without criticism—and even celebrate—that the law of free 
speech outweighs the harm of racism. They highlight but do not address the 
serious and enduring problem with First Amendment regulation of some 
speech (e.g., obscenity) but not other speech (e.g., racist speech). 292 
 In 2000 in Hill v. Colorado, for example, the Court addressed the consti-
tutionality of a Colorado statute regulating free speech outside of health clin-
                                                                                                                           
289 See Matal v. Tam, 137 S. Ct. 1744, 1765 (2017) (Alito, J., majority opinion); see also 15 
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ics.293 Justice Stevens, writing for the majority, upheld the statute, reasoning 
that it was content-neutral and satisfied strict scrutiny.294 In so doing, he used 
racism to make a point about what makes a law content-based. He wrote that a 
“statute making it a misdemeanor to sit at a lunch counter for an hour without 
ordering any food would also not be ‘content based’ even if it were enacted by 
a racist legislature that hated civil rights protesters.”295 Similarly, in 2000 in 
California Democratic Party v. Jones, Justice Stevens used a race hypothetical 
in his dissent to make the point that political parties are constitutionally per-
mitted to advocate white supremacy and support only candidates that follow 
their racist views.296 
CONCLUSION 
 This examination of the Supreme Court’s rhetoric surrounding racism 
reveals a number of patterns in both the definition of the words “racism,” “rac-
ist,” and “white supremacy” and the Court’s relationship to racism. 
 Definitionally, the predominant substantive usage of the words “racism” 
and “racist” occur in references from the usual-suspects and racism-out-there 
categories. The definition that emerges is one in which racism occurs only in 
extreme intentional instances (often where the racism is open or admitted) or 
passively and nebulously, as something that just happens. Only spotty refer-
ences acknowledge unconscious racism, and these references disappeared over 
a quarter century ago. References labeling racism in cases not involving ex-
treme or intentional bias are similarly spotty and declining, with the last refer-
ence of this kind in 1994. 
 The trend in usage suggests that even this narrow definition may be 
shrinking. The Court is less likely in modern times (post 1986) to label even 
the usual suspects such as the Ku Klux Klan or Jim Crow laws as racist in ma-
jority opinions. This decrease in usage combined with the sharp rise in refer-
ences attacking the use of these words suggests an emerging definition of rac-
ism in which very little behavior warrants the label. 
 This narrow definition has been further distorted by the increasing num-
ber of usages that flip the meaning of “racism.” The opinions explicitly deny-
ing or minimizing racism, coupled with the opinions using “racism” (or “rac-
ist”) to refer to bias against whites, corrupt the definition of “racism” into a 
                                                                                                                           
293 530 U.S. 703, 707 (2000). 
294 Id. at 714. 
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powerful false myth that Black people use racism to unfairly harm white peo-
ple. This definition is most clearly seen when the Court’s opinions use the 
keywords “racist” or “racism” in situations that disadvantage whites or depict 
whites as the truly down-trodden, depict Black civil rights leaders as the “real 
racists,” or decry any charge of racism as uncivil. 
 The definition of “white supremacy” is similarly narrow, although it is 
harder to determine because the Court so rarely uses the term. The most fre-
quent use of “white supremacy” is to refer to usual suspects (as with “racism,” 
almost always mentioning the Klan or Jim Crow) or as a comparator. Likely 
because it was the term used in Loving, “white supremacy” as a comparator 
surfaces in two major gay rights cases, Obergefell and Lawrence. In those two 
cases, the Court used the term to minimize the harm of homophobia. 
 Finally, using “racism” and “white supremacy” as comparators is also 
among the most common uses and further degrades the definition of these 
terms. In these references, the Court opinions use the keywords in hypotheti-
cals and strawman references to deny rights to others and as tools for white 
people’s linguistic exploitation. The Court uses these terms to deny rights to 
others by employing definitions of “racism” and “white supremacy” that create 
competition among marginalized communities.297 Similarly, the comparator 
references that celebrate tolerance of racism as a positive constitutional value 
(as in the cross-burning cases) are also damaging. If the Court constructs toler-
ance of racism as not just constitutional but as a positive cultural value, then 
advocates fighting racism face the significant hurdle of having to attack that 
cultural value. All of these different uses of “racism” and “white supremacy” 
chip away at the substance and strength of the definitions. 
 The Court’s use of “racist” and “racism” in its jurisprudence makes clear 
that it accepts little responsibility for racism and white supremacy in America. 
First, although the Court’s history of upholding white supremacy and fostering 
racism cannot be denied, the Court majority never directly acknowledges its 
role by using the words “racism” or “white supremacy.” The Court certainly 
never apologizes for its upholding and constructing racism in the law, not in 
Korematsu or in Dred Scott v. Sanford or in Plessy v. Ferguson.298 Second, alt-
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hough some Justices have called out the Court’s complicity in racism or white 
supremacy in separate opinions, these instances are rare. The most forceful 
calling-out of the Court’s racism, Justice Murphy’s direct charge over seventy-
five years ago in Korematsu that the majority opinion “legalized racism,” has 
never been duplicated. Moreover, the rhetoric in the later calling-out opinions 
was typically weak or indirect, even when the Court’s responsibility is indis-
putable. The rhetorical trend is to accuse the Court of negligence—of ignoring 
or overlooking racism, rather than causing it or tolerating it. This trend goes 
hand in hand with the Court’s denial that it can fix racism, together eroding the 
Court’s potential as a source for racial justice. 
 Because the warped definitions of “racism” and “white supremacy” are 
deeply embedded in the Court’s opinions and, perhaps more disturbing, have 
found their way into the opinions of even those Justices who support antiracist 
laws and policies, advocates seeking racial justice from the Court will find it 
increasingly difficult to effect change. Advocates attempting to make antiracist 
arguments face a decision-making body that does not accept anything but the 
narrowest and responsibility-avoidant use of the term. They also face a Court 
that embraces definitions of these terms that embolden claims of white inno-
cence and encourage white fragility. 
 If this Article shows that the Court has fallen short in its approach to de-
fining and identifying racism, it also stands as a challenge to those Justices 
who seek to fight racism: call out racism when you see it and do so directly 
and unequivocally. Call the Court to account for past decisions that enabled 
racism. Using the words is part of the hard work of fighting racism. That work 
can be done by the majority, but also by those who are writing separately. Im-
portant rhetorical work can be done in separate opinions.299 
 When the Court takes responsibility for its role in perpetuating racism, it 
opens up rhetorical space for the law to become part of the solution. Calling 
out racism also provides a foothold (and a citation) for advocates trying to 
achieve racial justice. Finally, for the victims of racism, calling out the law’s 
complicity in racism is of great significance, not just as a matter of law but as a 
matter of cultural and social importance. 
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